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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation comprises three essays on backstop technology as a key to weak 
sustainability of commodity resources.  Through the use of a basic model of renewable 
ground water, the first essay separately looks at water scarcity problems posed by growing 
water demand and stochastic rainfall.  The role of artificial ground water recharge in 
augmenting the ground water supply is examined.  The second essay looks at a long-run 
relationship between the prices of two substitutable resources, ethanol and oil, and tests the 
hypothesis that the derived demand for fuel ethanol in the US is perfectly elastic.  The 
Johansen and Jesulius multivariate cointegration methodology finds no cointegration 
between the ethanol price and the gasoline price while the Gregory and Hansen residual-
based tests for cointegration in models with regime shifts indicate that the long-run 
relationship between the ethanol price and the gasoline price exists with a possible structural 
break.  The third essay looks at water recycling in ethanol production as a means to reduce 
some of the ethanol pressure on the (ground) water resources.  Although modern ethanol 
plants possess sophisticated water treatment techniques for water recycling, water recycling 
is done only when it is cheaper than obtaining water from the outside source.  Since water 
recycling can lower the cost of production, it may adversely induce production expansion 
and lead to more outside water being used by the plants.  The conditions under which this 
possibility occurs are examined. 
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CHAPTER 1.  GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
1 Introduction 
The first lesson in economics is scarcity.  Human wants are unlimited, whereas the 
means to fulfill them are not.  Just as individuals do not have enough income to meet all of 
their desires, an entire economy also faces resource scarcity.  Given unprecedented growth in 
natural resource consumption in the US over the past two centuries and finite supplies of 
natural resources, a question arises whether the future resource supplies will be sufficient to 
sustain economic growth (Krautkraemer, 2005).  In order to answer this question, a 
distinction must be made between commodity resources and amenity resources.  Commodity 
resources are used to produce material goods and services.  Since they have a lot of close 
substitutes and can be enhanced by technology, they do not need to be physically maintained 
to be sustainable as long as the rents derived from their use are reinvested.  Amenity 
resources, on the other hand, provide recreational benefits and environmental services to 
people.  Since their supplies are fixed and they are irreplaceable, they need to be physically 
maintained to be sustainable.  This dissertation looks at the role of backstop technology in 
sustainability of commodity resources.  As resources become scarcer, their price increases 
and signals a switch to a relatively more expensive renewable substitute, which is sometimes 
called a backstop technology.      
Specifically, the first essay separately looks at water scarcity problems posed by 
growing water demand and stochastic rainfall.  The role of artificial ground water recharge in 
augmenting the ground water supply is examined.  Though ground water is replenishable, it 
can be depleted if withdrawals exceed recharge for a long period of time.  When that occurs, 
other sources of water may be needed.  A basic model of renewable ground water is extended 
to see how different sources of water could be used to maximize the net benefits of water 
consumption over time.   
The second essay looks at a long-run relationship between the prices of two 
substitutable resources, ethanol and oil, and tests the hypothesis that the derived demand for 
fuel ethanol in the US is perfectly elastic.  The Johansen and Jesulius multivariate 
cointegration methodology is used to examine whether the ethanol price and the gasoline 
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price are cointegrated.  The Gregory and Hansen (1996) residual-based tests for cointegration 
in models with regime shift are utilized to see if a long-run equilibrium ethanol price 
equation exists with a structural break. 
The third essay examines the possibility of water recycling in a corn-based fuel 
ethanol plant leading to more outside water being used by the plant due to production 
expansion caused by changes in the cost structure of the plant in the presence of water 
recycling.  A static model of a profit maximizing fuel ethanol plant is used in making a 
comparison between the amount of outside water withdrawn by the plant when there is no 
water recycling and the amount of outside water withdrawn by the plant when there is water 
recycling.  Alternative recycling incentives and their impacts on outside water use are also 
considered.   
2 Research Motivation 
The motivation for the dissertation comes from an article in a newspaper about the 
use of Ada Hayden lake as a potable water supply back up in Ames, Iowa (Zientara, 2006, p. 
F1).  The city of Ames relies on a ground water system for its potable water.  So it would be 
interesting to see when and how water should be pumped from the lake to a ground water 
recharge area to artificially recharge the aquifer so that the net benefits of water consumption 
are maximized over time.  Besides potable water use, there are other uses of water in Ames.  
One of which is water use by ethanol plants.  A considerable amount of water required for 
ethanol production can put a strain on the local (ground) water sources.  So it would be 
interesting to see how water recycling could help reduce the amount of outside water 
withdrawn by the plants.  As ethanol is used in the US as an oxygenate, an octane enhancer, 
and a gasoline volume extender, the demand for fuel ethanol can be considered as being 
derived from both government regulations, which mandate oxygenate use, and the gasoline 
market.  So it would be interesting to look at a relationship between the ethanol price and the 
gasoline price. 
3 Dissertation Organization 
This dissertation is organized as follows.  The next chapter contains the first essay, 
“water supply system: potable water and artificial ground water recharge.”  A basic model of 
3 
renewable ground water with artificially recharged ground water and water from other cities 
as backstop technologies is provided.  Chapter 3 contains the second essay, “US fuel ethanol 
demand,” and provides a vector error correction model (VECM) used in finding a 
cointegrating relationship between the ethanol price and the gasoline price.  Chapter 4 
contains the third essay, “water recycling in fuel ethanol plant,” and provides a static model 
of fuel ethanol production used in examining water recycling in fuel ethanol plant.  Chapter 5 
concludes.  
4 References 
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McGraw-Hill.  
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Krautkraemer, J. A.  (2005).  Economics of natural resource scarcity: the state of the 
debate [Discussion paper].  Resources for the future.  Retrieved July 23, 2009 from the 
World Wide Web: http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP-05-14.pdf 
Tietenberg, T. H.  (2006).  Environmental and natural resource economics.  Pearson 
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Zientara, B.  (2006, March 19).  Hayden lake serves as Ames’ H2O backstop.  The 
Tribune,  pp.  F1, F2. 
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CHAPTER 2.  WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM: POTABLE WATER AND 
ARTIFICIAL GROUND WATER RECHARGE 
 
A paper to be submitted to 
The American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
 
Jittinan Aukayanagul 
 
Abstract 
The model of renewable ground with backstop is extended to study the role of 
artificial ground water recharge in augmenting ground water supply.  The impacts of growing 
water demand and stochastic rainfall, i.e. the key factors for water scarcity, on intertemporal 
potable water use are separately examined. 
1 Introduction 
Turn on a water faucet and out comes the water one needs.  The water supply may 
seem endless.  But a cheap supply is not.  A question arises as to how different sources of 
water might be used so that the discounted net benefits of water consumption are maximized.  
The problem of intertemporal water management has attracted much research over time.  
Much of the literature focuses on the agricultural aspect of the water use.  For instance, 
Gisser and Mercado (1973) looks at intertemporal ground water management problem in a 
semiarid agricultural region, integrating a demand function for irrigation water with a 
hydrologic model of an aquifer.  Surface water is used to artificially recharge the aquifer.  
Deterministic natural recharge of the aquifer is assumed.  Tsur (1991) studies management of 
an irrigation and drainage system where water comes from both ground and surface water 
sources.  Ground water and surface water are assumed perfect substitutes in the water 
response function.  Direct artificial recharge of ground water is not allowed.  However, a 
fraction of ground water and surface water applied for irrigation is assumed to permeate into 
the aquifer.  The amount of rainfall is treated as a constant and included as part of surface 
water applied for irrigation.  In some cases, attention is paid to the non-agricultural aspect of 
the water use.  Krulce, Roumasset, and Wilson (1997) looks at the intertemporal potable 
water management problem in a coastal area of Hawaii, where water comes primarily from 
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an aquifer and where costly desalinated oceanic water is the infinite backstop.  Fixed inflow 
to the aquifer from rainfall is assumed.  The issue of growing water demand is also 
addressed. 
As can be seen, the natural addition to the ground water stock or the rainfall is often 
treated as constant or known.  Despite the abundant literature on uncertainty in the theory of 
renewable resources, e.g. Pindyck (1980); Pindyck (1984); Hertzler (1991); Slade and Thille 
(1997); and Costello and Polasky (2006), the stochastic aspect of the intertemporal water 
management problem has not been examined by very many studies.  Among exceptions is 
Burt (1964) where a general stochastic renewable resource allocation model is applied to 
ground water storage control.  The effects of changes in the expected natural addition to the 
ground water stock on the optimal ground water consumption are analyzed.  Another 
exception is Palma (2004) which extends the deterministic models of conjunctive ground and 
surface water management to ones in which there exist quality difference between the two 
water sources and uncertainty in surface water availability.  Surface water is treated as 
exogenous so that by choosing total water use the amount of ground water extracted is 
established.  A portion of the used water is assumed to infiltrate the aquifer.  However, no 
direct artificial ground water recharge is allowed.   
This paper looks at the intertemporal water management problem in a city where 
ground water is the primary source of potable water.  Surface water is the city’s secondary 
source.  However, it is used only to artificially recharge the aquifer.  This is based on the 
assumption that surface water is not as clean as ground water and can easily become 
contaminated.  Since bacteria and other potential disease-causing agents are often absorbed 
and filtered out of ground water, the final treatment of artificially recharged ground water, if 
necessary, becomes much easier and cheaper than that of surface water (Balke & Zhu, 2008).  
Among areas where artificial ground water recharge is known to exist are localities in 
Arizona; Los Angeles, Orange County, and Fresno, California; Alachua County, Florida; 
Ames, Iowa; Long Island and Nassau County, New York, and the High Plains States.1  
                                                          
1 Denver Basin, Colorado; Equus Beds, Kansas; Wood River and York, Nebraska; Turner-Hogeland, Montana; 
Blaine Gypsum, Oklahoma; Hueco Bolson, Texas; and Huron, South Dakota 
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Surface water spreading is one of the simplest and the most widely used artificial ground 
water recharge methods in these areas.2  The city’s third source of water is to purchase clean-
and-ready-to-use water from other cities where rainfall is spatially uncorrelated.3  The paper 
extends Krulce et al.’s (1997) model of renewable ground water under growing water 
demand and constant rainfall to study the role of artificial ground water recharge in 
augmenting the ground water supply.  The impact of stochastic rainfall (i.e. another key 
factor for water scarcity besides growing water demand) on intertemporal water use is also 
examined.  However, since solving model which accounts for both growing water demand 
and stochastic rainfall can prove challenging, constant water demand is assumed when 
examining the impact of stochastic rainfall on intertemporal water use. 
The paper is organized in the following way.  A basic model of renewable ground 
water with artificially recharged ground water and water from other cities as backstop 
technologies is presented in the next section.  The third section examines the impact of 
growing water demand on intertemporal water use.  To focus on water scarcity problem 
posed by growing water demand, constant rainfall is assumed.  A numerical example for 
Ames, Iowa is provided to show specifically the optimal drawdown of ground water in its 
transition to steady state and the artificial ground water recharge path.  The fourth section 
deals with stochastic rainfall and its implication on intertemporal water use.  To focus on 
water scarcity problem posed by stochastic rainfall, the potential time dependence of the 
water demand is ignored.  In other words, the water benefit function is assumed not to 
change over time.  For illustrative purpose, a numerical example for Ames, Iowa is also 
provided.  The fifth section concludes.          
2 Model 
Notations used in the model are as follows.  Let )(tG  be the stock of ground water at 
time t  and 0G  be the initial stock of ground water.  Extracting ground water at lower stock
                                                          
2 Surface water spreading is possibly done via ponds, check dams, pits, furrows, or ditches and involves 
releasing water over ground surface to increase the quantity of water infiltrating into the ground and percolating 
down to a shallow, unconfined aquifer. 
3 Another option could be to put in a water treatment plant to take advantage of quarries and other surface water 
sources in the area.  For cities close to the ocean, water desalination may be used (Krulce et al., 1997).   
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levels requires deeper drilling of the wells, as well as water to be lifted greater distances.  
Therefore, the marginal ground water extraction cost ( ))(tGC g  is a positive, decreasing, 
convex function of the ground water stock.  In other words, it is assumed that ( ) 0)( >tGC g , 
( ) 0)( <tGC gG , ( ) 0)( >tGC gGG , and ( ) ∞=
→
)(lim
0)(
tGC g
tG
.  As the aquifer gets close to 
exhaustion ( 0)( =tG ), the extraction cost rises rapidly.   
In each period, an amount )(tg  of ground water is drawn from the aquifer.  At the 
same time, a fraction 1<τ  of the rainfall )(tR  permeates into the aquifer.  Moreover, an 
amount )(ta  can be pumped from the lakes or any other surface water sources at a constant 
marginal cost aC  to spreading basins4 to artificially recharge the aquifer.  However, only a 
fraction 1<ω  of that amount percolates down to the aquifer.  This is because the amount of 
water entering the aquifer by surface water spreading depends on the infiltration rate of soil,5 
the percolation rate of soil,6 and the capacity for horizontal water movement (O’Hare, 
Fairchild, Hajali, & Canter, 1986, pp. 1-28).  Since recharge structures such as ponds, check 
dams, pits, furrows, or ditches are needed for surface water spreading, there may be a limit to 
the amount of water maintained over the spreading basins at each time.  In addition, there 
may be limits to the capacities of the pumping equipments and, as the lakes may be used for 
fishing and other water-based activities, a limit to the amount of water pumped from the 
lakes to the spreading basins.  Therefore, it is assumed that there is an upper limit a  on the 
artificial recharge from the lakes, i.e. ata <)( .  As a result, the ground water stock evolves 
over time as { }dttgtatRtdG )()()()( −+= ωτ . Due to today’s high water demand, the aquifer 
is assumed to never fill up. 
Besides the ground water, clean-and-ready-to-use water may be brought in from other 
cities at a high marginal cost bC .  Let )(tb  be water drawn from this backstop source.  
Because the ground water and the water obtained from other cities are treated as perfect 
                                                          
4 These are areas with exceedingly permeable soil used to artificially recharge ground water.  
5 This is the rate at which water on the ground surface enters the soil. 
6 This is the rate at which water is able to move downward through the soil.  It depends on vertical hydraulic 
conductivity (i.e. a measure of soil’s ability to transmit water when submitted to hydraulic gradient). 
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substitutes in terms of quality,7 the total benefit associated with water use is ( )ttbtgB ),()( + .  
This benefit function is allowed to change over time and is positive, increasing, and concave 
in the amount of water used.  In other words, it is assumed that ( ) 0),()( >+ ttbtgB , 
( ) 0),()(1 >+ ttbtgB , and ( ) 0),()(11 <+ ttbtgB .  Also because the city needs water, one has 
that ( ) ∞=+
→+
ttbtgB
tbtg
),()(lim 10)()( .  
Given a real social discount rate 0>r , the social planner chooses the extraction rate 
of ground water, the artificial ground water recharge rate, and the use of desalinated oceanic 
water to maximize the expected present value of net social surplus associated with water use, 
assuming all the constraints are met.  The social planner’s optimization problem is 
characterized as follows: 
 ( ) ( )[ ]{ }dttbCtaCtgtGCttbtgBeE bagrt
tGtbtatg ∫∞ − −−−+00)(),(),(),( )()()()(),()(max       (2.1)                 
 subject to  { }dttgtatRtdG )()()()( −+= ωτ  
   ata ≤)(  
0)(),(),( ≥tbtatg  
0)0( GG =  
3 Growing Water Demand 
This section examines the impact of growing water demand on the intertemporal 
water use.  The water demand may grow over time because of increasing population, rising 
income, and growing general economic activities in the area.  To focus on water scarcity 
problem posed by growing water demand, constant rainfall is assumed. 
3.1 Optimal Rules 
With constant rainfall R , the current value Hamiltonian for system (2.1) is: 
 ( ) ( ){ } { } ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−++−+
−−−+
=
)()()()()(
)()()()(),()(
)(
tgtaRttaat
tbCtaCtgtGCttbtgB
tH
bag
ωτλδ
                                 (3.1.1)                               
where 0)( ≥tλ .  The necessary conditions for an optimal solution are:  
 ( ) ( ) 0)()(),()(1)( )( ≤−−+=∂∂ ttGCttbtgB gtg tH λ , 0)( ≥tg , 0)()( )( =∂∂ tgtg tH       (3.1.2)
                                                          
7 The quality difference of the two may come in terms of different extraction costs. 
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 0)()()(
)( ≤+−−=∂
∂ ttC ata
tH ωλδ , 0)( ≥ta , 0)()( )( =∂∂ tata tH                                 (3.1.3) 
 0)()(
)( ≥−=∂
∂ taat
tH
δ , 0)( ≥tδ , 0)()( )( =∂∂ tttH δδ                                        (3.1.4) 
 ( ) 0),()(1)( )( ≤−+=∂∂ btb tH CttbtgB , 0)( ≥tb , 0)()( )( =∂∂ tbtb tH                                 (3.1.5) 
 ( ) )()()()()( )( )( tgtGCtrtrt gGtG tH +=−= ∂∂ λλλ&                                                 (3.1.6) 
 )()()( tgtaRtG −+= ωτ&                                                                          (3.1.7) 
 0)(lim =−
∞→
te rt
t
λ                                                                                                 (3.1.8) 
 0)0( GG =                                                                                                  (3.1.9) 
Before proceeding, it is useful to think of the marginal benefit ( )ttbtgB ),()(1 +  as an inverse 
demand.  Let’s define ( )ttbtgBtp ),()()( 1 +≡ , where )(tp  is the optimal price at time t .  
Again, the water demand is assumed to grow over time.  Since one cannot live without water, 
i.e. ( ) ∞=+
→+
ttbtgB
tbtg
),()(lim 10)()( , and if the cost of obtaining water from other cities 
bC  is 
sufficiently high, ground water is always extracted ( 0)( >tg ).  From (3.1.2), one has: 
  ( ) )()()( ttGCtp g λ+=                                                                            (3.1.10) 
The marginal benefit of extracting ground water is equal to the marginal cost which breaks 
down into marginal extraction cost and marginal user cost.  (3.1.10) provides the optimal rule 
for the ground water extraction.  Note, however, that the social optimal rule may not be 
achieved if the ground water use is left to the market (i.e. the market valuation of )(tλ  equals 
zero because of the common property nature of the ground water). 
(3.1.6) must hold for all cases, i.e. whether water is pumped from the lakes and/or 
obtained from other cities. Rearranging (3.1.6) yields the following: 
 ( ) )()()()( trtgtGCt gG λλ =−&                                                                (3.1.11) 
This is simply an arbitrage condition, stating that the change in the marginal user cost from 
not consuming )(tg  plus the reduction in the future extraction cost from the increase in the 
stock of ground water by )(tg  must equal the interest amount on the benefit that would have 
been gained should )(tg  be consumed.  In other words, the benefit of extracting ground 
water must equal the cost at the margin.  
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From (3.1.3) and (3.1.4), the following can be obtained: 
if ωλ
aCt <)( , then 0)( =ta .  (3.1.12) 
if ωλ
aCt =)( , then ata ≤≤ )(0 .                                                      (3.1.13) 
if ωλ
aCt >)( , then ata =)( .                                                                          (3.1.14) 
(3.1.12), (3.1.13), and (3.1.14) provide the optimal rule for the artificial recharge of 
the aquifer.  Water is pumped from the lakes if the net marginal benefit of having a unit more 
of water underground is equal to or greater than the unit cost of water that actually goes 
down to the aquifer, ( ) ωλ aCg tGCtpt ≥−= )()()( . 
Rewriting (3.1.5) yields the following: 
  bCtp ≤)( , 0)( ≥tb , { } 0)()( =− tbCtp b                                                  (3.1.15) 
(3.1.15) states that the water price or the marginal benefit of the water use must equal the 
cost of obtaining water from other cities.  This provides the optimal rule for the use of water 
from other cities. 
Taking the time derivative of (3.1.10) yields the following:  
 ( ) )()()()( ttGtGCtp gG λ&&& +=                                                         (3.1.16) 
Substituting in (3.1.6), (3.1.7), and (3.1.10), (3.1.16) becomes: 
 ( ){ } ( ){ })()()()()( tGCtprtaRtGCtp ggG −++= ωτ&                                       (3.1.17)   
As can be seen, the two terms on the right-hand side of (3.1.17) have opposite signs.  So, 
even though the benefit function is assumed to grow over time, it is unclear whether the price 
is rising or falling along optimal path. 
In steady state, sustainability of ground water implies )()()( tptGt &&& ==λ .  The 
following can be obtained: 
 ( )r gGC
g
G
***
−=λ                                                                                        (3.1.18) 
  ** aRg ωτ +=                                                                                              (3.1.19) 
 ( ){ } ( ){ }****0 GCpraRGC ggG −++= ωτ                                                 (3.1.20)   
Given *p  and *a , unique *G  can be derived from (3.1.20).  This is because the derivative 
with respect to *G  of the right-hand side of (3.1.20) is unambiguously positive, 
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( ){ } ( ) 0>−+ GrCaRGC gGgGG ωτ .  Note also that, with finite *λ  from (3.1.18), (3.1.8) 
automatically holds. 
If the demand is high enough and growing, which again could come from increasing 
population, rising income, and growing general economic activities in the area, eventually 
the aquifer and the lakes will not be able to completely satisfy the city’s water needs.  
Another source of water may be needed.  That is when water from other cities comes in.8  
Therefore, (3.1.15) requires that bCp =*  in steady state.  Moreover, if bC  is sufficiently 
high, one has that ωλ
aC>*  and water is pumped from the lakes at full capacity in steady state.  
With aa =* , it can then be obtained from (3.1.19) that aRg ωτ +=*  or ground water 
outflow equals ground water inflow.  Also substituting aa =*  and bCp =*  in (3.1.20) 
gives: 
 ( ){ } ( ){ }**0 GCCraRGC gbgG −++= ωτ                                                  (3.1.21) 
(3.1.21) is an implicit equation for the unknown *G . 
If ω
aC  is high enough, though not as high as bC , no water is pumped from the lakes 
when the demand is low.  Thinking of water from the lakes as artificially recharged ground 
water, because it has to be pumped to the aquifer, one has that it costs more to produce 
potable water from artificially recharged ground water than from natural ground water.9  In 
this sense, the city resorts to water from the lakes only when needed (i.e. when it is less 
costly). 
Depending on the parameter values and the functional forms chosen, the solution may 
entail the following stages.  Initially, the demand is low so that the marginal benefit of 
extracting ground water is not that much different from the marginal extraction cost (i.e. 
( ) 0)()()( →−= tGCtpt gλ ).  Natural ground water alone can satisfy the city’s water need.  
No water is pumped from the lakes.  No water is obtained from other cities.  The optimal 
control problem in this period is governed by the system of differential equations below: 
                                                          
8 This water takes care of the growing water demand in the long run. 
9 Water naturally percolates down to the aquifer. 
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 )()( tgRtG −=τ&                                                             (3.1.22) 
 ( ) ( ){ })()()()( tGCtprRtGCtp ggG −+= τ&                                                  (3.1.23) 
 where ( )ttgBtp ),()( 1=   
The demand grows so that the city becomes indifferent between no pumping and 
pumping any amount within a  from the lakes.  Nevertheless, the demand is not yet at a point 
where water from other cities is needed.  In this period IIt , one has 0)( =IItλ& .  From (3.1.6), 
( ))()( IIgG
a
tGC
rC
IItg ω−=  is derived.  Substituting into (3.1.10) where ( )IIIIIIII ttbtgBtp ),()()( 1 +≡ , 
0)( =IItb , and ωλ
aC
IIt =)( , the following can be obtained: 
 ( )( ) ( ) ωω aIIgG a CIIgIItGC rC tGCtB +=− )(,)(1                                                                  (3.1.24)                              
(3.1.24) is an implicit equation for )( IItG  in period IIt  where ωλ
aC
IIt =)( . 
The demand grows so that water is always pumped from the lakes at full capacity.  
Artificially recharged ground water is used alongside natural ground water.  However, water 
from other cities is not yet used as the marginal benefit of consuming water is still below the 
marginal cost of obtaining water from other cities.  The optimal control problem in this 
period is governed by: 
 )()( tgaRtG −+= ωτ&                                                                     (3.1.25) 
 ( ){ } ( ){ })()()()( tGCtpraRtGCtp ggG −++= ωτ&                                         (3.1.26) 
 where ( )ttgBtp ),()( 1=  
The demand grows so high so that the marginal benefit of consuming water reaches 
the marginal cost of obtaining water from other cities bC .  The system reaches steady state.  
All sources of water are used.  Water from other cities supplies part of the demand not yet 
satisfied by the ground water. 
Solving these differential equations requires techniques used in dealing with the 
boundary value problems.  To see clearly how this works and the dynamic behavior of the 
system, let’s look at a numerical example for Ames, Iowa below.   
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3.2 Numerical Example 
The city of Ames, Iowa relies on a ground water system for its potable water.  The 
water is harvested from the Ames aquifer (Alluvial10 and Pleistocene11) via 19 ground water 
wells.  The aquifer is about 100 feet or less deep and is regularly recharged from rainfall at 
an assumed rate of 3.0=τ .  The city’s average annual liquid precipitation is 34.11 inches 
which is approximately equivalent to 13,000,000 thousand gallons of water.12  So 
000,000,13=R .   
When the demand is high and cannot be satisfied by the natural ground water alone, 
water can be pumped from Hallett’s Quarry,13 Peterson’s Pits, and possibly other surface 
water sources in the area to spreading basins to artificially recharge the aquifer.  Since only 
about 75% of the pumped water actually reaches the aquifer (Simpkins & Christianson, 2005, 
p. 25), let 75.0=ω .  For illustrative purpose, let’s assume the constraint on the artificial 
recharge is 1,000,000 thousand gallons of water per pumping.  So 000,000,1=a .  According 
to John R. Dunn (personal communication, April 30, 2007), director of Ames water and 
pollution control department, the cost of the most recent pumping operation (in the fall of 
2000) was approximately $0.6 per a thousand gallon of pumped water.14  So 6.0=aC . 
In addition to the aquifer and the lakes, let’s assume the city has an option of having 
water transported in from other cities at a high cost of $6 per a thousand gallon of water.15  
So 6=bC . 
The marginal cost of ground water extraction and the benefit associated with water 
use are modeled as in Krulce et al. (1997).  Specifically, the functional form for the cost 
function is ( ) ( )ntGGbaseg baseCtGC )()( = , where baseC  is the marginal ground water extraction cost
                                                          
10 Geological deposits of the current river valley composed of clay, silt, sand, gravel, or similar material 
deposited by running water 
11 Similar to Alluvial, but more surface sediment covering a prehistoric buried channel formation 
12 See http://mesonet.agron.iastate.edu/request/coop/fe.phtml for liquid precipitation data for Ames, Iowa. 
13 Converted into 1,200,000-thousand-gallon Ada Hayden lake in 2004   
14 The costs of pumping 35.38 million gallons of water from Peterson’s Pits over 27 days in the fall of 2000 
were $22,105 of labor.  Diesel engine/generator set was used.  However, it consumed very little fuel (i.e. 2 to 3 
gallons per day maximum for diesel fuel).  
15 So far this option has never been used by the city.  On the contrary, the city has been providing water to 
Xenia rural water district.  Krulce et al. (1997) uses $3.00 per a thousand gallon of water as the unit cost of 
desalination for the city of Oahu, Hawaii. 
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at the ground water stock baseG .  n  determines the rate at which the cost rises to infinity as 
the stock gets close to exhaustion ( 0)( =tG ).  As can be seen, ( ) ( ) 0)( )()( <−= ntGGtGnCgG basebasetGC  
and ( ) { } ( ) 0)( )()(1 2 >= + ntGGtG CnngGG basebasetGC .  For illustrative purpose, let’s assume 3.0=baseC , 
000,000,15=baseG , and 1=n . 
The benefit function is modeled as ( ) ( )∫ +=+ )()(0 1),()( tbtg Xe dXttbtgB t ηβα , yielding a 
constant elasticity demand function that grows over time at a constant rate β  of the form 
( )ηβα 1)()()( tbtg e ttp += .  η  is the demand elasticity.  Also it can be derived further that 
( ) { } ( ) 0),()( 1)()()()( 111 <−=+ ++ ηβαη tbtg etbtg tttbtgB .  For illustrative purpose, let’s assume 01.0=β  
and16 5.0=η .  α  is chosen to normalize the demand to actual price and quantity data.  As of 
now, the price of potable water in Ames is $2 per a thousand gallon of water and the water 
consumption is approximately 2,500,000 thousand gallons per year.17  Therefore, 
534,535,32*000,500,2)0(*)0( 5.0 === ηα pg .   
Again, following Krulce et al. (1997), the real social discount rate 03.0=r  is used. 
Table 1 summarizes all the parameter values for Ames, Iowa: 
 
Table 1.  Parameter values for Ames, Iowa (growing demand) 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
τ  0.3 baseG  15,000,000 
R  13,000,000 n  1 
ω  0.75 β  0.01 
a  1,000,000 η 0.5 
aC  0.6 α  3,535,534 
bC  6 r 0.03 
baseC  0.3   
 
                                                          
16 Water demand elasticity ranges from 0.1 to 0.7 in absolute value.  See Olmstead (2009), Martinez-Espineira 
(2007), Nauges (2003), Renwick, Green, and McCorkle (1998), and Thomas and Syme (1988) for more details.  
17 See http://www.cityofames.org/WaterWeb/WaterPlant/Home.htm for more details. 
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With all the parameter values and the functional forms specified, the system can be 
solved using Mathematica.  In steady state, one has 6* == bCp  and 000,000,1* == aa .  
(3.1.19) yields 000,650,4* =g .  (3.1.21) gives 400,163,11* =G .  From (3.1.18),  
ωλ
aC
=>= 8.06.5*  is obtained, ensuring full capacity pumping of water from the lakes in 
steady state.  
Let’s now turn to period IIt  where the city is indifferent between no pumping and 
pumping any amount within a  from the lakes.  In this case, (3.1.24) gives the optimal 
ground water stock )( IItG  that is increasing in IIt .  This results in 800,919,25)0( ==IItG .  
The optimal price )( IItp  can then be derived from (3.1.10).  Let 
start
IIt  be the time when the 
system enters period IIt .  With )( IItG , )( IItp , 0G , (3.1.22), and (3.1.23), 
start
IIt  can be 
obtained using NDSolve in Mathematica.18  However, if the initial ground water stock 0G  is 
less than )0( =IItG , positive 
start
IIt  can never be found.  As a result, it is not optimal to start 
with no artificial recharge ( 0)( =ta ) when the initial ground water stock is small 
( )0(0 =< IItGG ).  Instead, water should be pumped from the lakes at full capacity 
( ata =)( ) right from the beginning.   
3.2.1  Small )0(0 =< IItGG  
According to Zientara (2006), the city’s water source capacity (wells and supply 
capacity) is about 10,500 to 11,000 thousand gallons per day.  If this implies, for instance, 
000,700,150 =G  thousand gallons (four years of supply) and since 
)0(800,919,25000,700,150 ==<= IItGG , it is the case for the city to always pump water 
from the lakes at full capacity.  The social planner chooses )(tG  and )(tp  that evolve as 
(3.1.25) and (3.1.26) respectively such that the system moves toward steady state.   
                                                          
18 This is a boundary value problem.  The solution method requires solving for startIIt  such that the solution to 
the system of differential equations (3.1.22) and (3.1.23) with boundary conditions )( startIItG  and )(
start
IItp  
results in the initial ground water stock 0G . 
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Let st  be the time when the system enters steady state.  With 400,163,11
*
=G , 
6* =p , 000,700,150 =G , (3.1.25), and (3.1.26), it is found that 17.131=st .  Therefore, it 
would take approximately 131 years before water from other cities is used.  During this 
period, the optimal ground water stock is allowed to first rise to reduce future extraction cost 
of ground water.  The process reverses at some point, as the demand grows, and the optimal 
stock falls to the steady state level.  This is shown in Figure 1:   
 
 
Figure 1.  Optimal stock of ground water when 0G  is small 
 
The optimal water price, on the other hand, falls at first and then rises to the steady state level 
bC .  This can be seen in Figure 2: 
 
 
Figure 2.  Optimal price of water when 0G  is small 
 
Over time, the marginal user cost is always above the unit cost of water that actually goes 
down to the aquifer by means of pumping ( 8.0)( => ωλ
aCt ), which is why the artificial 
recharge is done at full capacity in this case.  Figure 3 shows the difference over time 
between these two numbers ( ωλ
aCt −)( ).  As can be seen, the difference is always positive.
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Figure 3.  ωλ
aCt −)(  when 0G  is small 
 
3.2.2  Large )0(0 => IItGG  
Conversely, if the initial ground water stock 0G  is greater than )0( =IItG , positive 
start
IIt  can be found.  For illustrative purpose, let the initial ground water stock be 31,400,000 
thousand gallons (eight years of supply).  Since )0(800,919,25000,400,310 ==>= IItGG ,  
5.18=startIIt  is found.  Therefore, the period of no artificial recharge ( 0)( =ta ) should 
last approximately 18 years.  During this period, the ground water stock first increases as the 
natural addition to the ground water stock is greater than the ground water extraction.  The 
process reverses at some point, as the demand grows, and the ground water stock decreases 
until it equals 700,549,28)5.18( ==startIItG .  This is shown in Figure 4: 
 
 
Figure 4.  Ground water stock for period when 0)( =ta  and 0G  is large 
 
The water price, on the other hand, increases over time from $0.872 to $0.958 per a thousand 
gallon, which can be seen in Figure 5: 
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Figure 5.  Water price for period when 0)( =ta  and 0G  is large 
 
Moreover, the marginal user cost is always below the unit cost of water that actually goes 
down to the aquifer by means of pumping in this period ( 8.0)( =< ωλ
aCt ), which is why no 
artificial recharge is done.  Figure 6 shows the difference over time between these two 
numbers ( ωλ
aCt −)( ).  The difference is always negative. 
 
 
Figure 6.  ωλ
aCt −)(  for period when 0)( =ta  and 0G  is large 
 
Once startIIt  is reached, the system enters period IIt  where ωλ
aC
IIt =)( .  In this period, 
the optimal ground water stock is )( IItG  and
19 the optimal price is ( ) ωaCIIgII tGCtp += )()( .  
)( IItg  can then be derived from ( ) )(),(1 IIIIII tpttgB = .  The optimal ground water stock 
evolves as )()()( IIIIII tgtaRtG −+= ωτ& , which results in ω
τ )()()( IIII tgRtGIIta
+−
=
&
.  Let endIIt  be 
the time when the system exits period IIt .  Setting )( IIta  equal a , one can solve for 
end
IIt .  In 
this case, )( IIta  is increasing in IIt .  For the solution to exist, it must be that ata
start
II <)( , 
which is the case for 000,000,1=a  as ata startII =<== 000,000,1677,794)5.18( .  
                                                          
19 Again, (3.1.24) provides an implicit equation for )( IItG . 
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79.21=endIIt  is then found.  Therefore, period IIt  where ωλ
aC
IIt =)(  would last approximately 
3 years.  Figure 7 shows the optimal artificial ground water recharge over this period.  As 
can be seen, the optimal artificial recharge rises over time until it reaches full capacity.   
 
 
Figure 7.  Optimal artificial ground water recharge for period IIt  when 0G  is large 
 
At the same time, the optimal stock of ground water increases from 
700,549,28)5.18( ==startIItG  to 000,043,29)79.21( ==
end
IItG  in this period, which is shown 
in Figure 8:   
 
 
Figure 8.  Optimal ground water stock for period IIt  when 0G  is large 
 
The optimal price, on the other hand, decreases slightly from $0.958 to $0.955 per a thousand 
gallon, which can be seen in Figure 9.    
Once the system reaches endIIt , water would be pumped from the lakes at full capacity.  
With 400,163,11* =G , 6* =p , 000,043,29)79.21( ==endIItG , (3.1.25), and (3.1.26), it is 
found that 11.131=st .  Therefore, this period of full capacity artificial ground water 
recharge would last approximately 110 years before steady state is attained.  In this period, 
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the optimal ground water stock rises from 000,043,29)79.21( ==endIItG  for some time.  It 
then falls to the steady state level 400,163,11* =G .  This is depicted in Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 9.  Optimal water price for period IIt  when 0G  is large 
 
 
Figure 10.  Optimal ground water stock for period when ata =)(  and 0G  is large 
 
The optimal water price rises over time until the steady state level bC  is reached.  It then 
stays there forever.  This is shown in Figure 11: 
  
 
Figure 11.  Optimal water price for period when ata =)(  and 0G  is large 
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In addition, the marginal user cost is always above the unit cost of water that actually goes 
down to the aquifer by means of pumping in this period ( 8.0)( => ωλ
aCt ), which is why the 
artificial recharge is done at full capacity.  Figure 12 shows the difference over time between 
these two numbers ( ωλ
aCt −)( ).  The difference is always positive. 
 
 
Figure 12.  ωλ
aCt −)(  for period when ata =)(  and 0G  is large 
 
3.2.3  No Artificial Recharge Allowed at All Times 
Note that if the artificial ground water recharge is not allowed,20 the problem 
becomes precisely Krulce et al. (1997).  The city relies entirely on its natural ground water 
when the demand is low.  Water from other cities is used only when the demand becomes so 
high such that the price equals the cost of obtaining water from other cities.  Setting 0* =a , 
one has from (3.1.20) that the steady state ground water stock is 300,256,10* =G  and from 
(3.1.19) that  the steady state ground water extraction is 000,900,3* =g . 
With small initial ground water stock 000,700,150 =G , it would take approximately 
114.2 years for the city to start using water from other cities.  The optimal ground water 
stock is first allowed to rise to reduce the future extraction cost.  At some point, as the 
demand grows, the optimal stock falls until it reaches the steady state level.  This is shown in 
Figure 13:
                                                          
20 Surface water cannot be pumped to the aquifer.   
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Figure 13.  Optimal ground water stock when no artificial recharge is allowed and 0G  is small 
 
The optimal price, on the other hand, falls at first and later rises to the steady state level.  
This is shown in Figure 14: 
 
 
Figure 14.  Optimal water price when no artificial recharge is allowed and 0G  is small 
 
With large initial ground water stock 000,400,310 =G , it would take approximately 
114.5 years for the city to start using water from other cities.  Figure 15 shows the optimal 
path of the ground water stock in this case. 
 
 
Figure 15.  Optimal ground water stock when no artificial recharge is allowed and 0G  is large 
 
The optimal price path is shown in Figure 16 below:  
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Figure 16.  Optimal water price when no artificial recharge is allowed and 0G  is large 
 
As can be seen, it takes longer for costly water from other cities to be used when the 
artificial recharge of the aquifer is possible. 
4  Stochastic Rainfall 
This section examines the impact of stochastic rainfall on the intertemporal water use.  
To focus on water scarcity problem posed by stochastic rainfall, constant water demand is 
assumed.  Faced with increase in rainfall variability, the city may not grow any longer. 
Let rainfall be stochastic.  If )(tRS  is the amount of rainfall the city has had up until 
time t  and )(tdRS  follows the Ito’s process, the amount of rainfall per period dt  can be 
expressed as the following: 
 dzRdttdRSdttR Γ+== )()( , dtdz tε= , and21 ( )1,0~ Ntε                       (4.1) 
where R  is the expected instantaneous rainfall and dt
2Γ  is the instantaneous variance.  The 
ground water stock, in this case, changes according to the following differential equation: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) dzdttgtaRdttgtadzRdttdG Γ+−+=−+Γ+= τωτωτ )()()()()(             (4.2) 
As a result, the optimization problem becomes: 
 ( ) ( )[ ]{ }dttbCtaCtgtGCtbtgBeE bagrt
tGtbtatg ∫∞ − −−−+00)(),(),(),( )()()()()()(max       (4.3)               
 subject to  ( ) dzdttgtaRtdG Γ+−+= τωτ )()()( , dtdz tε= , and ( )1,0~ Ntε  
      ata ≤)( , 0)(),(),( ≥tbtatg  
0)0( GG =
                                                          
21 Normal distribution is widely used in the literature because it is well behaved and mathematically tractable.  
Central limit theorem provides a theoretical justification for its use.    
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4.1  Optimal Rules 
The Bellman equation of system (4.3) can then be expressed as follows: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]( )( ) ⎪⎭
⎪⎬⎫⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧
++
−−−+
=
− )(
)()()()()()(
max)(
)(),(),( dttGVEe
dttbCtaCtgtGCtbtgB
tGV
t
rdt
bag
tbtatg
   (4.1.1) 
 subject to  ( ) dzdttgtaRtdG Γ+−+= τωτ )()()( , dtdz tε= , and ( )1,0~ Ntε      
            ata ≤)(                                                                                                        
0)(),(),( ≥tbtatg                                                                                                   
0)0( GG =  
Applying Taylor’s series expansion and Ito’s lemma, one has: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }221 )()()()()()( tdGtGVtdGtGVtGVdttGV GGG ++=+                 (4.1.2) 
Substituting in ( ) dzdttgtaRtdG Γ+−+= τωτ )()()(  and { } { } dttdG t 222)( Γ= τε , (4.1.2) 
becomes: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( ) { }[ ]( ) ⎪⎭
⎪⎬⎫⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧
Γ+
Γ+−++
=+
dztGV
dttGVtgtaRtGVtGV
dttGV
G
tGGG
τ
τεωτ
)(
)()()()()(
)(
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2
1
           (4.1.3) 
Taking expectation of (4.1.3) and using ( ) 0=dzEt  and ( ) 12 =ttE ε , one has the following: 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( ){ }( ){ } dttGV
tgtaRtGV
tGVdttGVE
GG
G
t ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
Γ+
−+
+=+ 2
2
1 )(
)()()(
)()(
τ
ωτ
              (4.1.4) 
Rearranging (4.1.4) gives: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ){ }( ){ } ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
Γ+
−+
=−+= 2
2
1
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)(
)()()(
)()()(
τ
ωτ
tGV
tgtaRtGV
tGVdttGVEtGdVE
GG
G
tdttdt
         (4.1.5) 
Substituting (4.1.4) into (4.1.1) and noting that )1( rdte rdt −≈−  and 2)(dt  goes to zero faster 
than dt  for an infinitesimally small dt , it can be obtained that: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )[ ] ⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
Γ+−++
−−−+
=
2
2
1)(),(),( )()()()(
)()()()()()(
max)(
τωτ tGVtgtaRtGV
tbCtaCtgtGCtbtgB
tGrV
GGG
bag
tbtatg
          (4.1.6)              
 subject to  ( ) dzdttgtaRtdG Γ+−+= τωτ )()()( , dtdz tε= , and ( )1,0~ Ntε   
           ata ≤)( , 0)(),(),( ≥tbtatg  
0)0( GG =
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The first order necessary conditions for an optimal solution are shown below: 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ } 0)(,0)(,0)(
)()()(
:)( 1
1
=−−≥≤
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−
−+
tgVCBtg
tGV
tGCtbtgB
tg G
g
G
g
     (4.1.7) 
 ( ) ( ){ } 0)(,0)(,0)()(:)( 11 =−≥≤−+ tbCBtbCtbtgBtb bb                               (4.1.8) 
 ( ) 0)(,0)(:)( =<+− tatGVCta Ga ω                                                            (4.1.9) 
  ata => )(,0                                                                             
                          ata ≤≤= )(0,0  
where ( ))(tGVG  is the benefit of having an additional unit of water underground (i.e. 
marginal user cost of ground water).  (4.1.7) and (4.1.8) provide optimal rules for uses of 
ground water and water from other cities respectively.  Water is extracted from each source 
when the marginal net benefit associated with water use equals zero.  (4.1.9) provides 
optimal rule for the artificial ground water recharge.  Since the optimization problem is linear 
in the amount of artificial recharge, water is pumped to the aquifer when the net benefit of 
having ω  additional units of water underground is greater than or equal to zero. 
4.2  Solutions 
Assuming high cost of obtaining water from other cities (i.e. assuming sufficiently 
high bC ), it must be that water is pumped to the aquifer at full capacity a , regardless of 
whether the ground water is used, whenever water from other cities is used.  In addition, the 
city should extract as much as possible from the less expensive water sources before 
extracting from the more expensive ones.  As a result, five solution cases are feasible.  They 
are as shown in Figure 17.  At time t , given the ground water stock )(tG , the city chooses 
how much )(tg  to extract from the aquifer, how much )(ta  to pump to the aquifer, and how 
much )(tb  to obtain from other cities. 
For Case I, Case II, and Case III, the city relies entirely on ground water (i.e. using 
no water from other cities).  So it must be from (4.1.7) that the marginal benefit associated 
with water use equals the marginal cost of using ground water:    
 ( ) ( ) ( ))()()(1 tGVtGCtgB Gg +=                                                               (4.2.1)
26 
and from (4.1.8) that the marginal benefit associated with water use is less than the marginal 
cost of obtaining water from other cities: 
 ( ) bCtgB <)(1                                                                                                (4.2.2) 
Given the current ground water stock )(tG  and that the value function ( ))(tGV  is known, the 
city knows exactly from (4.2.1) how much ground water to extract: 
 ( ) ( )( ))()()( 11 tGVtGCBtg Gg += −                                                                   (4.2.3) 
As can be seen, the amount of ground water extracted at time t  does not depend on current 
rainfall.   
 
 
Figure 17.  Five possible solution cases under stochastic rainfall and sufficiently high bC  assumptions 
 
In this sense, no ground water conservation is practiced in a time of drought in Case I, Case 
II, and Case III.  For the city to be able to rely entirely on ground water at time t , the 
current ground water stock )(tG  must be sufficiently large.  The large stock of ground water 
makes it possible for the city to extract without having to worry about current rainfall. 
 
Case I: 0)(,0)(,0)( ==> tatbtg   
Since no water is pumped to the aquifer, it must be from (4.1.9) that the benefit of 
having an additional unit of water underground is less than the cost: 
 ( ) ωaCG tGV <)(                                                                                          (4.2.4) 
Substituting (4.2.3), 0)( =tb , and 0)( =ta  into (4.1.6) gives the following:
Case II 
ata ≤≤ )(0  
Case III 
ata =)(  
)(tG  
Case I 
0)( =ta  
Case V 
0)( =tg  
0)( >tb  
ata =)(  
0)(,0)( => tbtg  Case IV 
0)( >tg  
0)( >tb  
ata =)(  
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      (4.2.5) 
(4.2.5) is a second-order differential equation which can be solved for the value function 
( ))(tGV CaseI .  Using ( ))(tGV CaseIG  in (4.2.3) gives the optimal ground water extraction: 
 ( ) ( )( ))()()( 11 tGVtGCBtg CaseIGgCaseI += −                                                        (4.2.6) 
where the ground water stock )(tG  must be sufficiently large so that the city resorts to 
neither artificial ground water recharge nor water from other cities (i.e. )(tG  must be such 
that ( ) ωaCCaseIG tGV <)(  and ( ) bsCaseI CtgB <)(1  hold).  Although current rainfall has no impact 
on the amount of ground water extracted at time t , it does determine the level of ground 
water stock at the subsequent time dtt + .  This is because the optimal ground water stock 
evolves according to ( ) dzdttgRtdG CaseI Γ+−= ττ )()(  in this case. 
When current rainfall is sufficiently large (i.e. ( )τ )()( tgdtdz CaseIR >Γ+ ) so that the natural 
recharge to the aquifer is greater than the amount of water extracted from the aquifer at time 
t , the ground water stock at the subsequent time dtt +  must be larger than the current 
ground water stock (i.e. )()( tGdttG >+ ).  Unless there is a reason to believe that the 
marginal user cost of ground water is increasing in the ground water stock, the larger ground 
water stock at time dtt +  must also be sufficiently large so that the city resorts to neither 
artificial ground water recharge nor water from other cities at time dtt +  (i.e. )( dttG +  must 
be such that ( ) ωaCCaseIG dttGV <+ )(  and ( ) bsCaseI CdttgB <+ )(1  hold).  Therefore, it is optimal 
for the city to stay in Case I at time dtt + .   
When current rainfall is sufficiently small (i.e. ( )τ )()( tgdtdz CaseIR <Γ+ ) so that the natural 
recharge to the aquifer is smaller than the amount of water extracted from the aquifer at time 
t , the ground water stock at the subsequent time dtt +  must be smaller than the current 
ground water stock (i.e. )()( tGdttG <+ ).  Assuming the marginal user cost of ground water 
is decreasing in the ground water stock (i.e. assuming ( ) 0)( <tGV CaseIGG ), the smaller ground 
water stock at time dtt +  may not be sufficiently large to keep the city from resorting to 
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other more expensive water sources at time dtt +  (i.e. )( dttG +  may not be such that 
( ) ωaCCaseIG dttGV <+ )(  and ( ) bsCaseI CdttgB <+ )(1  hold).  Therefore, Case I may no longer be 
optimal at time dtt + .   
• If current rainfall is such that the ground water stock at time dtt +  equals22 CaseIIG  
(i.e. ( ) ( ) ( )τττ )()()()( tgdt tGGtgdtdz CaseICaseIICaseIR <+=Γ+ − ), the city should switch to Case II 
where23 it is optimal to pump some water to the aquifer in addition to using the 
natural ground water.   
• If current rainfall is such that the ground water stock at time dtt +  is smaller than 
CaseIIG  but larger than24 CaseIVG  (i.e. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )dt tGGtgdtdzdt tGGtg CaseIICaseICaseIVCaseI R ττττ )()()()( )( −− +<Γ+<+ ), the 
city should switch to Case III where25 it is optimal to pump water to the aquifer at 
full capacity a  in addition to using the natural ground water.   
• If current rainfall is such that the ground water stock at time dtt +  equals CaseIVG  
(i.e. ( ) ( ) ( )dt tGGtgdtdz CaseIVCaseIR ττ )()( −+=Γ+ ), the city should switch to Case IV where26 it is 
optimal to obtain water from other cities at the cost of bC  and to pump water to the 
aquifer at full capacity a  in addition to using the natural ground water.   
• If current rainfall is such that the ground water stock at time dtt +  is smaller than 
CaseIVG  (i.e. ( ) ( )dt tGGtgdtdz CaseIVCaseIR ττ )()()( −+<Γ+ ), the city should switch to Case V 
where27 it is optimal to rely entirely on water from other cities (i.e. using no ground 
water)  while letting the aquifer recharge naturally and artificially. 
 
Case II: atatbtg ≤≤=> )(0,0)(,0)(  
Since some water is pumped to the aquifer, it must be from (4.1.9) that the benefit of 
having an additional unit of water underground equals the cost:
                                                          
22 See Case II for definition of CaseIIG . 
23 See Case II for more details. 
24 See Case IV for definition of CaseIVG . 
25 See Case III for more details. 
26 See Case IV for more details. 
27 See Case V for more details. 
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 ( ) ωaCG tGV =)(                                                                                           (4.2.7) 
Differentiating (4.1.6) with respect to )(tG , invoking the envelope theorem, and 
applying (4.1.5) yields the following: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ))()()()( 1 tGdVEtgtGCtGrV GtdtgGG +−=                                                   (4.2.8) 
It can then be derived from (4.2.7) and (4.2.8) that: 
 ( ))()( tGC
rC
g
G
atg
ω
−=                                                                                            (4.2.9) 
Substituting (4.2.9) and (4.2.7) in (4.2.1) gives: 
 ( )( ) ( ) ωω aCaseIIgG a CCaseIIgGC rC GCB +=−1                                                               (4.2.10) 
(4.2.10) is an implicit equation for CaseIIG .  CaseIIG  is the ground water stock that must be 
maintained so that the benefit of having an additional unit of water underground equals the 
cost.  It is then obtained from (4.2.9) that the ground water extraction must also be constant, 
i.e. ( )CaseIIgG
a
GC
rCCaseIIg
ω
−= .  As a result, the artificial ground water recharge must be allowed to 
change according to current rainfall to keep the ground water stock at CaseIIG .  In other 
words, water conservation is not needed in a time of drought as more artificial ground water 
recharge would be done.  Setting )(tdG  equal to zero yields ( ) ( ) dtdzRgCaseII CaseIIta ωτω τ Γ− −=)( .  
However, for ataCaseII ≤≤ )(0  to hold, current rainfall must fall within the below range:                                
 ( ) ( ) ( )ττ ω CaseIICaseII gdtdzag R ≤Γ+≤−                                                                         (4.2.11) 
When current rainfall falls above (4.2.11) range (i.e. ( ) ( )τCaseIIgdtdzR >Γ+ ), the natural 
recharge to the aquifer is greater than the amount CaseIIg  extracted from the aquifer.  So 
0)( <ta  is required to keep the ground water stock at CaseIIG .  But because )(ta  cannot be 
lower than zero, the ground water stock at the subsequent time dtt +  must be larger than 
CaseIIG .  The larger ground water stock eliminates the need to pump water to the aquifer at 
time dtt + .  Therefore, the city should switch to Case I where it is optimal to rely entirely 
on the natural ground water. 
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When current rainfall falls below (4.2.11) range (i.e. ( ) ( )τ ωagdtdz CaseIIR −<Γ+ ), the 
natural recharge to the aquifer is smaller than the amount CaseIIg  extracted from the aquifer.  
So ata >)(  is required to keep the ground water stock at CaseIIG .  But because )(ta  can only 
be at most a  in this case, the ground water stock at the subsequent time dtt +  must be 
smaller than CaseIIG .  The smaller ground water stock raises the marginal user cost of ground 
water and may generate the need for other more expensive water sources at time dtt + .  As a 
result, Case II will no longer be optimal at time dtt + . 
• If current rainfall is such that the ground water stock at time dtt +  is smaller than 
CaseIIG  but larger than CaseIVG  (i.e. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )τ ωττ ω agdtdzdtGGag CaseIICaseIICaseIVCaseII R −−− <Γ+<+ ), the 
city should switch to Case III where it is optimal to pump water to the aquifer at full 
capacity a  in addition to using the natural ground water. 
• If current rainfall is such that the ground water stock at time dtt +  equals CaseIVG  
(i.e. ( ) ( ) ( )dtGGagdtdz CaseIICaseIVCaseIIR ττ ω −− +=Γ+ ), the city should switch to Case IV where it is 
optimal to obtain water from other cities at the cost of bC  in addition to using the 
natural and artificially recharged ground water.   
• If current rainfall is such that the ground water stock at time dtt +  is smaller than 
CaseIVG  (i.e. ( ) ( ) ( )dtGGagdtdz CaseIICaseIVCaseIIR ττ ω −− +<Γ+ ), the city should switch to Case V 
where it is optimal to rely entirely on water from other cities (i.e. using no ground 
water) while letting the aquifer recharge naturally and artificially. 
 
Case III: atatbtg ==> )(,0)(,0)(   
Since water is pumped to the aquifer at full capacity a , it must be from (4.1.9) that 
the benefit of having an additional unit of water underground is greater than the cost: 
 ( ) ωaCG tGV >)(                                                                                             (4.2.12) 
Substituting (4.2.3), 0)( =tb , and ata =)(  into (4.1.6) gives the following:
31 
( )
( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]
( )[ ] ⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
Γ
+−++−
+−+
=
−
−−
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
)(
)()()(
)()()()()(
)(
τ
ωτ
tGV
tGVtGCBaRtGVaC
tGVtGCBtGCtGVtGCBB
tGrV
GG
G
g
G
a
G
gg
G
g
         (4.2.13)                
(4.2.13) is a second-order differential equation which can be solved for the value function 
( ))(tGV CaseIII .  Using ( ))(tGV CaseIIIG  in (4.2.3) gives the optimal ground water extraction:  
 ( ) ( )( ))()()( 11 tGVtGCBtg CaseIIIGgCaseIII += −                                                     (4.2.14) 
where the ground water stock )(tG  must be small for the city to pump water to the aquifer at 
full capacity a , though not sufficiently small for the city to obtain water from other cities yet 
(i.e. )(tG  must be such that ( ) ωaCCaseIIIG tGV >)(  and ( ) bCaseIII CtgB <)(1  hold).  Although 
current rainfall has no impact on the amount of ground water extracted at time t , it does 
determine the level of ground water stock at the subsequent time dtt + .  This is because the 
optimal ground water stock evolves according to    ( ) dzdttgaRtdG CaseIII Γ+−+= τωτ )()(  in 
this case.                                                                                             
When current rainfall is sufficiently large (i.e. ( )τ ωatgdtdz CaseIIIR −>Γ+ )()( ) so that the 
natural and artificial recharge to the aquifer is greater than the amount of water extracted 
from the aquifer, the ground water stock at the subsequent time dtt +  must be larger than the 
current ground water stock (i.e. )()( tGdttG >+ ).  Assuming the marginal user cost of 
ground water is decreasing in the ground water stock (i.e. assuming ( ) 0)( <tGV CaseIIIGG ), the 
larger ground water stock may reduce or eliminate the need to pump water to the aquifer at 
time dtt +  (i.e. )( dttG +  may not be such that ( ) ωaCCaseIIIG dttGV >+ )(  holds).  As a result, 
Case III may no longer be optimal at time dtt + .   
• If current rainfall is such that the ground water stock at time dtt +  equals CaseIIG  (i.e. 
( ) ( ) ( )τ ωττ ω atgdt tGGatgdtdz CaseIIICaseIICaseIIIR −−− >+=Γ+ )()()()( ), the city should switch to Case II 
where it is optimal to pump some water to the aquifer in addition to using the natural 
ground water.   
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• If current rainfall is such that the ground water stock at time dtt +  is larger than 
CaseIIG  (i.e. ( ) ( )dt tGGatgdtdz CaseIICaseIIIR ττ ω )()()( −− +>Γ+ ), the city should switch to Case I 
where it is optimal to rely entirely on the natural ground water. 
When current rainfall is sufficiently small (i.e. ( )τ ωatgdtdz CaseIIIR −<Γ+ )()( ) so that the 
natural and artificial recharge to the aquifer is smaller than the amount of water extracted 
from the aquifer, the ground water stock at the subsequent time dtt +  must be smaller than 
the current ground water stock (i.e. ))()( tGdttG <+ .  Assuming the marginal user cost of 
ground water is decreasing in the ground water stock (i.e. assuming ( ) 0)( <tGV CaseIIIGG ), the 
smaller ground water stock may generate the need for water from other cities at time dtt +  
(i.e. )( dttG +  may not be such that ( ) bsCaseIII CdttgB <+ )(1  holds).  As a result, Case III 
may no longer be optimal at time dtt + .  
• If current rainfall is such that the ground water stock at time dtt +  equals CaseIVG  
(i.e. ( ) ( ) ( )τ ωττ ω atgdt tGGatgdtdz CaseIIICaseIVCaseIIIR −−− <+=Γ+ )()()()( ), the city should switch to Case 
IV where it is optimal to obtain water from other cities at the cost of bC  in addition 
to using the natural and artificially recharged ground water.   
• If current rainfall is such that the ground water stock at time dtt +  is smaller than 
CaseIVG  (i.e. ( ) ( )dt tGGatgdtdz CaseIVCaseIIIR ττ ω )()()( −− +<Γ+ ), the city should switch to Case V 
where it is optimal to rely entirely on water from other cities (i.e. using no ground 
water) while letting the aquifer recharge naturally and artificially. 
 
Case IV: atatbtg =>> )(,0)(,0)(  
The city relies on both ground water and water from other cities.  So it must be from 
(4.1.7) that the marginal benefit associated with water use equals the marginal cost of using 
ground water:    
 ( ) ( ) ( ))()()()(1 tGVtGCtbtgB Gg +=+                                                          (4.2.15)   
and from (4.1.8) that the marginal benefit associated with water use equals the marginal cost 
of obtaining water from other cities:
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 ( ) bCtbtgB =+ )()(1                                                                                      (4.2.16) 
It is then derived from (4.2.15) and (4.2.16) that the marginal cost of using ground water 
must equal the marginal cost of obtaining water from other cities for both ground water and 
water from other cities to be used: 
 ( ) ( ) bGg CtGVtGC =+ )()(                                                                               (4.2.17) 
Assuming high cost of obtaining water from other cities (i.e. assuming sufficiently high bC ), 
(4.2.17) implies that the benefit of having an additional unit of water underground is greater 
than the cost: 
 ( ) ( ) ωaCgbG tGCCtGV >−= )()(                                                                      (4.2.18)                              
This is why water is pumped to the aquifer at full capacity a  whenever water from other 
cities is used.  Again, the city should extract as much as it can from the less expensive water 
sources before extracting from the more expensive ones. 
Differentiating (4.1.6) with respect to )(tG , invoking the envelope theorem, and 
applying (4.1.5) yields the following: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ))()()()( 1 tGdVEtgtGCtGrV GtdtgGG +−=                                                 (4.2.19) 
It can then be derived from (4.2.17) and (4.2.19) that: 
 ( ){ } ( ){ }CaseIVgbCaseIVgG GCCraRGC −++= ωτ0                                                (4.2.20) 
(4.2.20) is an implicit equation for CaseIVG .  CaseIVG  is the level of ground water stock that 
must be maintained so that the marginal cost of using ground water in this case equals the 
marginal cost bC  of obtaining water from other cities.  As a result, the ground water 
extraction must be allowed to change according to current rainfall to keep the ground water 
stock at CaseIVG .  In this sense, water conservation is practiced in a time of drought in Case 
IV.  Setting )(tdG  equal to zero yields ( ) aRtg dtdzCaseIV ωτ +Γ+=)(  (i.e. the amount of water 
extracted from the aquifer must equal the natural and artificial recharge to the aquifer).  It 
then follows from (4.2.16) that ( ) )()( 11 tgCBtb CaseIVbCaseIV −= − .  Water from other cities takes 
care of the excess demand not yet satisfied by the ground water so that the marginal benefit 
34 
associated with water use equals the marginal cost bC  of obtaining water from other cities.  
However, for 0)( >tbCaseIV  to hold, current rainfall must fall within the below range: 
 ( ) ( )( )τ ωaCBdtdz bR −−<Γ+ 11                                                                                        (4.2.21) 
Since water from other cities takes care of the excess demand in a time of drought, the city 
will never switch to Case V at time dtt +  in this case. 
When current rainfall falls outside (4.2.21) range (i.e. ( ) ( )( )τ ωaCBdtdz bR −−>Γ+ 11 ), the 
ground water extraction )(tg CaseIV  is greater than ( )bCB 11− .  So 0)( <tb  is required to keep 
the marginal benefit associated with water use equal to the marginal cost bC  of obtaining 
water from other cities (i.e. 0)( <tb  is required so that ( ) bCaseIV CtbtgB =+ )()(1  holds).  But 
because )(tb  cannot be lower than zero, ( ) bCtbtgB =+ )()(1  would no longer hold if the 
ground water extraction was kept at )(tg CaseIV .  As a result, the city should extract 
( )bCaseIVA CBtg 11)( −=  in this case.  Since by construction the amount ( )bCB 11−  extracted from 
the aquifer is smaller than the natural and artificial recharge ( ) aR dtdz ωτ +Γ+  to the aquifer, 
the ground water stock at the subsequent time dtt +  must be larger than CaseIVG .  The larger 
ground water stock reduces or eliminates the need for other more expensive water sources at 
time dtt + .  As a result, Case IV will no longer be optimal at time dtt + .   
• If current rainfall is such that the ground water stock at time dtt +  is larger than 
CaseIVG  but smaller than CaseIIG  (i.e. ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )dtGGaCBdtdzaCB CaseIVCaseIIbb R ττ ωτ ω −−− +<Γ+< −− 1111 ), the 
city should switch to Case III where it is optimal to pump water to the aquifer at full 
capacity a  in addition to using the natural ground water. 
• If current rainfall is such that the ground water stock at time dtt +  equals CaseIIG  (i.e. 
( ) ( )( ) ( )dtGGaCBdtdz CaseIVCaseIIbR ττ ω −− +=Γ+ −11 ), the city should switch to Case II where it is 
optimal to extract ground water and pump some water to the aquifer.   
• If current rainfall is such that the ground water stock at time dtt +  is larger than 
CaseIIG  (i.e.  ( ) ( )( ) ( )dtGGaCBdtdz CaseIVCaseIIbR ττ ω −− +>Γ+ −11 ), the city should switch to Case I 
where it is optimal to rely entirely on the natural ground water.
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Case V: atatbtg =>= )(,0)(,0)(   
The city relies entirely on water from other cities as the ground water stock becomes 
significantly low to allow for the ground water recharge.  So it must be from (4.1.7) that the 
marginal benefit associated with water use is less than the marginal cost of using ground 
water: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ))()()(1 tGVtGCtbB Gg +<                                                                (4.2.22)        
and from (4.1.8) that the marginal benefit associated with water use equals the marginal cost 
bC  of obtaining water from other cities: 
 ( ) bCtbB =)(1                                                                                              (4.2.23) 
implying ( )bCaseV CBb 11−=   must be obtained from other cities in this case.  As can be seen, 
water from other cities takes care of all the water demand.  It is then derived from (4.2.22) 
and (4.2.23) that the marginal cost of using ground water must be greater than the marginal 
cost bC  of obtaining water from other cities for water from other cities alone to be used:  
 ( ) ( ) bGg CtGVtGC >+ )()(                                                                           (4.2.24) 
Assuming high cost of obtaining water from other cities (i.e. assuming sufficiently 
high bC ), (4.2.24) implies that the benefit of having an additional unit of water underground 
is greater than the cost: 
 ( ) ( ) ωaCgbG tGCCtGV >−> )()(                                                                    (4.2.25) 
Water is pumped to the aquifer at full capacity a  to expedite the ground water recharge. 
Since no water is extracted from the aquifer, the ground water stock at the subsequent 
time dtt +  must be larger than the current ground water stock (i.e. )()( tGdttG >+ ).  
Assuming the marginal user cost of ground water is decreasing in the ground water stock (i.e. 
assuming ( ) 0)( <tGVGG ), the larger ground water stock may reduce or eliminate the need for 
other more expensive water sources at time dtt +   (i.e. )( dttG +  may not be such that 
( ) ( ) bGg CdttGVdttGC >+++ )()( ).  As a result, Case V may no longer be optimal at time 
dtt + .   
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• If current rainfall is such that the ground water stock at time dtt +  equals CaseIVG  
(i.e. ( ) ( ) ( )τωτ adt tGGdtdz CaseIVR −=Γ+ − )( ), the city should switch to Case IV where it is 
optimal to obtain water from other cities at the cost of bC  in addition to using the 
natural and artificially recharged ground water.   
• If current rainfall is such that the ground water stock at time dtt +  is larger than 
CaseIVG  but smaller than CaseIIG  (i.e. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )τωττωτ adt tGGdtdzadt tGG CaseIICaseIV R −<Γ+<− −− )()( ), the 
city should switch to Case III where it is optimal to extract ground water and pump 
water to the aquifer at full capacity a .   
• If current rainfall is such that the ground water stock at time dtt +  equals CaseIIG  (i.e. 
( ) ( ) ( )τωτ adt tGGdtdz CaseIIR −=Γ+ − )( ), the city should switch to Case II where it is optimal to 
extract ground water and pump some water to the aquifer.   
• If current rainfall is such that the ground water stock at time dtt +  is larger than 
CaseIIG  (i.e. ( ) ( ) ( )τωτ adt tGGdtdz CaseIIR −>Γ+ − )( ), the city should switch to Case I where it is 
optimal to rely entirely on the natural ground water.      
 
4.3  Numerical Example 
This section provides a numerical example for Ames, Iowa under stochastic rainfall.  
The needed parameter values and functional forms are as specified in section 3.2.  However, 
0=β  is used because of the assumed constant water demand.  To ease the computations of 
the value functions ( ))(tGV CaseIII  from (4.2.13) and ( ))(tGV CaseI  from (4.2.5), 1=η  is 
used.28  The benefit function can then be simplified to ( ) ( )] )()(ln)()( tbtgXtbtgB +=+ δα  where 
δ  is a small number close to zero.  Since the annual rainfall is assumed to follow the Ito’s 
process, one also needs to specify the variance parameter Γ .  According to the city’s liquid 
precipitation data obtained from Iowa Environmental Mesonet,29 000,800,2=Γ  is used.   
Table 2 summarizes all the parameter values used in this section:
                                                          
28 Again, η  is the demand elasticity. 
29 See http://mesonet.agron.iastate.edu/request/coop/fe.phtml for more details. 
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Table 2.  Parameter values for Ames, Iowa (stochastic rainfall) 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
τ  0.3 baseC  0.3 
R  13,000,000 baseG  15,000,000 
Γ  2,800,000 n  1 
ω  0.75 β  0 
a  1,000,000 η 1 
aC  0.6 α  3,535,534 
bC  6 r 0.03 
  
With all the parameter values and the functional forms specified, the system can be 
solved using Mathematica.   
 
Case II: atatbtg ≤≤=> )(0,0)(,0)(  
From (4.2.10), the ground water stock must be maintained at 700,110,26=CaseIIG .  
From (4.2.9), 100,636,3=CaseIIg  must be extracted from the aquifer.  It then follows that 
{ } { } )(4.0130,848,4)()( tRtRta CaseIIgCaseII −=−= ωτω  must be pumped to the aquifer.  From 
(4.2.11), current rainfall must fall within the range 300,120,12)(320,620,9 ≤≤ tR  for 
ataCaseII ≤≤ )(0  to hold.        
• If current rainfall is 300,120,12)( >tR , the city should pump no water to the aquifer 
at time t  and should switch to Case I at time 1+t . 
• If current rainfall is 320,620,9)(0 << tR , the city should pump water to the aquifer at 
full capacity 000,000,1=a  at time t  and should switch to Case III at time 1+t .   
• As current rainfall cannot be negative, the city will never switch to Case IV nor Case 
V at time 1+t .  With the assumed parameter values and functional forms above, 
water from other cities is not needed in a time of drought as natural and artificially 
recharged ground water can completely satisfy the water demand. 
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Case IV: atatbtg =>> )(,0)(,0)(  
From (4.2.20), the ground water stock must be maintained at 400,163,11=CaseIVG .  It 
then follows that 000,750)(3.0)()( +=+= tRatRtgCaseIV ωτ  must be extracted from the 
aquifer and ( ) )(3.0744,160)( 11 tRgCBtb CaseIVbCaseIV −−=−= −  must be obtained from other 
cities.  However, because )(tb  cannot be lower than zero, ( ) bCtbtgB =+ )()(1  would no 
longer hold if the ground water extraction was kept at 000,750)(3.0)( += tRtg CaseIV .  As a 
result, the city should extract from the aquifer ( ) 256,589)( 11 == − bCaseIVA CBtg  in this case.  
Since the amount of water entering the aquifer by means of pumping 000,750=aω  can 
completely satisfy the water demand at the price bC , there is no need for the city to resort to 
costly water from other cities when the current ground water stock is 400,163,11=CaseIVG  
regardless of current rainfall.  The ground water stock is then rising.    
• If 300,288,49)(0 << tR , the city should switch to Case III at time 1+t . 
• If 300,288,49)( =tR , the city should switch to Case II at time 1+t . 
• If 300,288,49)( >tR , the city should switch to Case I at time 1+t . 
• According to the city’s liquid precipitation data obtained30, the maximum annual 
rainfall over the past 114 years is approximately 22,300,000 thousand gallons of 
water.  As a result, it may be unlikely for the city to switch to Case II or Case I at 
time 1+t  when the current ground water stock is 400,163,11=CaseIVG . 
 
Case V: atatbtg =>= )(,0)(,0)(   
For Case V to be optimal, the current ground water stock must be such that 
CaseIVGtG =< 400,163,11)( .  From (4.2.23), 256,589=CaseVb  must be obtained from other 
cities.  Since no water is extracted from the aquifer, the ground water stock increases at the 
rate of recharge 000,750)(3.0)()( +=+= tRatRtdG ωτ . 
• If 3.0
)(500,711,34)( tGtR −= , the city should switch to Case IV at time 1+t . 
                                                          
30 See http://mesonet.agron.iastate.edu/request/coop/fe.phtml for more details. 
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• If 3.0
)(
3.0
)( 600,535,84)(500,711,34 tGtG tR −<<− , the city should switch to Case III at 
time 1+t . 
• If 3.0
)(600,535,84)( tGtR −= , the city should switch to Case II at time 1+t . 
• If 3.0
)(600,535,84)( tGtR −> , the city should switch to Case I at time 1+t . 
• Given that the current ground water stock must be CaseIVGtG =< 400,163,11)(  in this 
case and that the maximum annual rainfall over the past 114 years is approximately 
22,300,000 thousand gallons of water, it may be unlikely for the city to switch to 
Case II or Case I at time 1+t  in this case. 
 
Case III: atatbtg ==> )(,0)(,0)(  
For Case III to be optimal, the current ground water stock must be such that 
CaseIICaseIV GtGG =<<= 700,110,26)(400,163,11 .  To obtain the optimal rate of ground 
water extraction )(tg CaseIII , one needs to solve (4.2.13) for the value function ( ))(tGV CaseIII .  
This is done using NDSolve in Mathematica.  However, two boundary conditions are 
required.  Since (4.2.13) holds for CaseIICaseIV GtGG << )( , 
( ) ( )CaseIVgbCaseIVCaseIIIG GCCGV −=  is used as a boundary condition.  Another condition used 
is ( ) CaseIVCaseIVCaseIII VGV = , where CaseIVV  is chosen so that ( ) ωaCCaseIICaseIIIG GV =  holds.  In 
this case, 000,000,643,4=CaseIVV  is found.   
With (4.2.13), ( ) 597.5=CaseIVCaseIIIG GV , and ( ) 000,000,643,4=CaseIVCaseIII GV , the 
value function ( ))(tGV CaseIII  is obtained.  The marginal user cost of ground water 
( ))(tGV CaseIIIG  is then derived and shown in Figure 18.  As can be seen, the marginal user cost 
is always above the unit cost of water that actually goes down to the aquifer by means of 
pumping in Case III ( ( ) 8.0)( => ωaCCaseIIIG tGV ), which is why the artificial recharge is done 
at full capacity.  
40 
 
Figure 18.  ( ))(tGV CaseIIIG  for 700,110,26)(400,163,11 << tG  
 
From (4.2.14), the optimal rate of ground water extraction )(tg CaseIII  is then obtained.  
Figure  19 shows the optimal ground water extraction )(tg CaseIII  that is increasing in the 
ground water stock 700,110,26)(400,163,11 << tG . 
 
 
Figure  19. )(tg CaseIII  for 700,110,26)(400,163,11 << tG  
 
• If ( ) 600,535,84)( 3.0 )()( += − tGtg CaseIIItR , the city should switch to Case II at time 1+t . 
• If ( ) 600,535,84)( 3.0 )()( +> − tGtg CaseIIItR , the city should switch to Case I at time 1+t . 
• If ( ) 500,711,34)( 3.0 )()( += − tGtgCaseIIItR , the city should switch to Case IV at time 1+t . 
• If ( ) 500,711,34)( 3.0 )()( +< − tGtgCaseIIItR , the city should switch to Case V at time 1+t . 
• Given that the minimum annual rainfall over the past 114 years is approximately 
7,600,000 thousand gallons of water, since ( )[ ]500,711,34max 3.0 )()( +− tGtgCaseIII  is found to 
be below 7,600,000, it may be unlikely for the city to switch to Case IV or Case V at 
time 1+t  when the current ground water stock is 700,110,26)(400,163,11 << tG . 
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Case I: 0)(,0)(,0)( ==> tatbtg   
For Case I to be optimal, the current ground water stock must be such that 
CaseIIGtG => 700,110,26)( .  To obtain the optimal rate of ground water extraction )(tg CaseI , 
one needs to solve (4.2.5) for the value function ( ))(tGV CaseI .  Since (4.2.5) holds for 
CaseIIGtG >)( , ( ) ωaCCaseIICaseIG GV =  is used as a boundary condition.  Another condition used 
is ( ) ( )CaseIICaseIIICaseIICaseI GVGV = , where ( ) 000,066,644,4=CaseIICaseIII GV  is obtained from 
Case III above. 
With (4.2.5), ( ) 8.0=CaseIICaseIG GV , and ( ) 000,066,644,4=CaseIICaseI GV , the value 
function ( ))(tGV CaseI  is obtained.  The marginal user cost of ground water ( ))(tGV CaseIG  is 
then derived and shown in Figure 20: 
 
 
Figure 20.  ( ))(tGV CaseIG  for 700,110,26)( >tG  
 
As can be seen, the marginal user cost is always below the unit cost of water that actually 
goes down to the aquifer by means of pumping in Case I ( ( ) 8.0)( =< ωaCCaseIG tGV ), which is 
why no artificial recharge is done. 
From (4.2.6), the optimal rate of ground water extraction )(tg CaseI  is then obtained.  
Figure 21 shows the optimal ground water extraction )(tg CaseI  that is increasing in the 
ground water stock 700,110,26)( >tG . 
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Figure 21.  )(tg CaseI  for 700,110,26)( >tG  
   
• If ( ) 600,035,87)( 3.0 )()( += − tGtg CaseItR , the city should switch to Case II at time 1+t . 
• If ( ) ( ) 600,535,84)(500,211,37 3.0 )()(3.0 )()( +<<+ −− tGtgtGtg CaseICaseI tR , the city should switch 
to Case III at time 1+t . 
• If ( ) 500,211,37)( 3.0 )()( += − tGtgCaseItR , the city should switch to Case IV at time 1+t . 
• If ( ) 500,211,37)( 3.0 )()( +< − tGtgCaseItR , the city should switch to Case V at time 1+t . 
• Depending on the current ground water stock and the associated amount of ground 
water extracted at time t , Case IV and Case V may be unlikely at time 1+t . 
 
5  Conclusions 
The paper examines separately the impacts of growing water demand and stochastic 
rainfall on intertemporal water use.  The artificial ground water recharge role in alleviating 
water scarcity is investigated.  In both the growing water demand model and the stochastic 
rainfall model of the intertemporal water use, the city should already be extracting from the 
less expensive water sources before extracting from the more expensive ones. 
In the growing water demand model, because the water demand is assumed to grow 
over time, eventually ground water will not be able to completely satisfy the city’s water 
needs.  The city may have to resort to costly water from other cities to satisfy the excess 
demand.  Since the artificial ground water recharge adds to the natural ground water, it can 
help prolong the period of not having to purchase costly water from other cities and reduce 
ground water extraction cost.  However, only when the current ground water stock is 
2.62x107 2.66x107
7.5x106
1x107
1.25x107
1.5x107
)(tG
)(tg CaseI
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sufficiently small is the artificial ground water recharged used.  This is due to the costs 
associated with pumping water underground.  
In the stochastic rainfall model, it is not necessarily the case, though highly likely, 
that ground water is always extracted.  Because rainfall is assumed to be stochastic, the city 
may find itself with significantly low levels of ground water stock and that it is relatively 
cheaper to temporarily rely on water from other cities while letting the ground water 
recharge.  Water may be pumped to the aquifer to expedite the ground water recharge.  When 
the current ground water stock is sufficiently large, ground water alone can satisfy the city’s 
water needs regardless of current rainfall.  Since the city can extract ground water without 
having to worry about current rainfall, no ground water conservation is needed in this case.  
Depending on how large the current ground water stock is, the artificial ground water 
recharge may not be done due to the costs associated with pumping water underground.  
Only when the city relies on both ground water and water from other cities at the same time 
should ground water conservation be practiced.  The city should extract less ground water 
when current rainfall is small and extract more ground water otherwise.  The ground water 
stock is kept constant so that the cost of using ground water equals the cost of obtaining 
water from other cities.   
The growing water demand model and the stochastic rainfall model only apply to a 
growing city with small rainfall variability and a high-rainfall-variability city with small 
growth, respectively.  This is because constant rainfall is assumed in the growing water 
demand model and constant water demand is assumed in the stochastic rainfall model.  Since 
in the real world cities may be growing and at the same time experiencing highly variable 
rainfall, it would be ideal to look at the combined impact of growing water demand and 
stochastic rainfall on intertemporal water use.  Solving model which accounts for both 
growing water demand and stochastic rainfall can prove challenging and may be included in 
future work. 
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CHAPTER 3.  US FUEL ETHANOL DEMAND 
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Abstract 
This paper tests the hypothesis that the derived demand for fuel ethanol in the US is 
perfectly elastic to see whether a long-run relationship exists between the ethanol price and 
the gasoline price.  The Johansen and Jesulius multivariate cointegration methodology finds 
no cointegration between the ethanol price and the gasoline price while the Gregory and 
Hansen residual-based tests for cointegration in models with regime shifts indicate that the 
long-run relationship between the ethanol price and the gasoline price exists with a possible 
structural break.  
1  Introduction 
“Alcohol and driving don’t mix.  Or do they?  Actually, they go together just fine, so 
long as your vehicle is the one consuming alcohol” (“Just the basics,” 2003).  The history of 
ethanol as alternative transportation fuel in the US can be traced back to 1908 when Henry 
Ford came up with flexible fuel vehicle Model T that could run on ethanol, gasoline, or a 
combination of both.  Adding ethanol raises the octane level and the oxygen level of 
gasoline, making the engines run smoothly and more cleanly without the need for lead, other 
additives such as methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE), or further gasoline refining.  However, 
it was not until the 1970s when oil supply disruptions in the Middle East became a national 
threat and the US began to phase out lead in gasoline to protect public health that the interest 
in fuel ethanol started to rise.  Tax benefits and incentive programs, such as a federal subsidy 
of $0.54 per gallon for ethanol use31 and varying supplemental state subsidies, were set up to
                                                          
31 This federal tax credit of $0.54 per gallon for ethanol use was in effect until December 31, 2004.  On January 
1, 2005, a new federal tax credit of $0.51 per gallon for ethanol use went into effect. 
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promote fuel ethanol (Rask, 1998).  Nevertheless, MTBE was still the primary fuel additive 
used in the US at that time due to its better blending characteristics32 when compared with 
ethanol and possibly the limit-pricing behavior of MTBE refiners as argued in Zhang, 
Vedenov, and Wetzstein (2007).  Rask (1998) suggests that the high costs of transporting 
ethanol from the Midwest (production location) to other parts of the country might also be 
responsible for the lack of ethanol entry into the US fuel-additives market.  The importance 
of proximity to ethanol production may also explain a finding by Gallagher, Otto, and 
Dikeman (2000) that ethanol blending is more profitable than MTBE blending in the 
Midwest markets provided that the tax credit is in effect. 
The major switch to ethanol came in 2004 when the additive use of MTBE, made 
widespread by mandates of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) to reduce 
emissions in severely polluted regions, was banned33 in the primary MTBE-using states 
California, New York, and Connecticut due to MTBE ground water contamination (“Status 
and impact,” 2003).  By 2006, 19 states had partially or completely banned MTBE.34  The 
US transition to fuel ethanol was further aided by the 2005 Energy Policy Act (EPAct).  
While eliminating the 1990 CAAA oxygenate requirement for reformulated gasoline in 
attempt to reduce the MTBE use, the 2005 EPAct established a national renewable fuel 
standard (RFS) mandating an increase in biofuel use from 4 billion gallons in 2006 to 7.5 
billion gallons in 2012 (Neff, 2005).  The RFS target was later modified by the 2007 Energy 
Independence and Security Act (EISAct) to increase from 9 billion gallons in 2008 to 36 
billion gallons in 2022.  Starting in 2016, the 2007 EISAct also requires that all of the 
increase in the RFS target be met entirely with cellulose-based biofuels setting a ceiling of 15 
billion gallons of corn-based ethanol (Sissine, 2007).  Though recent developments with 
cellulosic biomass conversion technologies allow ethanol to be produced from trees, grasses, 
and crop wastes which are abundantly present at a comparatively low cost,35 these 
technologies are not yet profitable on a large scale due to their current poor conversion 
                                                          
32 See “MTBE fact sheet #3” (1998) for more details. 
33 See “State actions” (2004) for more details.    
34 See “State actions” (2004) for more details.    
35 Trees and grasses require less energy to grow than grains and do not have to be replanted every year 
(Biomass, 2006). 
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efficiency.  As a result, there has yet to be a commercial cellulose-based ethanol plant in 
operation and ethanol is primarily produced from corn in the US.  Figure 22 shows US fuel 
ethanol production over time (Energy Information Administration). 
 
 
Figure 22.  US fuel ethanol production (July 1981 – October 2008) 
 
Since ethanol is used in the US as an oxygenate, an octane enhancer, and a gasoline 
volume extender, the demand for fuel ethanol can be considered as being derived from both 
government regulations, which mandate oxygenate use, and the gasoline market.  As MTBE 
was the oxygenate of choice for most blenders in satisfying the 1990 CAAA oxygenate 
requirements of a minimum 2.7 weight percent36 oxygen in oxygenated gasoline and a 
minimum 2.1 weight percent37 oxygen in reformulated gasoline, the regulatory demand for 
fuel ethanol prior to the MTBE bans may not be viewed as a lower level or a floor on fuel 
ethanol use.  Only after the MTBE bans, when MTBE can no longer be used to satisfy the 
increasing RFS target, that the regulatory demand for fuel ethanol may be viewed as being 
perfectly inelastic at a quantity that is increasing over time.  The data from the Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) shows that, in 2006, the US fuel ethanol consumption 
exceeded the 2005 EPAct RFS target of 4 billion gallons.  In 2007, the 2005 EPAct RFS 
target of 7.5 billion gallons for 2012 was surpassed.  Even under the 2007 EISAct RFS, the 
EIA, in its June 2007 Annual Energy Outlook, expects the US fuel ethanol consumption to 
                                                          
36 This is equivalent to approximately 15 volume percent MTBE or 7.4 volume percent ethanol. 
37 This is equivalent to approximately 11.7 volume percent MTBE or 5.8 volume percent ethanol. 
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remain above the expanded and increasing RFS target until 2014.  As a result, the regulatory 
demand for fuel ethanol is expected to have little impact on the ethanol price and may be 
ignored after the MTBE bans.    
With E10 being the most widely used blend38 in the US, the derived demand by 
blenders for fuel ethanol is somewhat restricted by the 10-percent-ethanol-90-percent-
gasoline blending wall.  If ethanol is viewed by blenders as being a perfect substitute for 
gasoline at roughly two-thirds the energy value and the ethanol price is roughly two-thirds 
the price of gasoline, the derived demand for fuel ethanol may be considered as being 
perfectly elastic at a price pe  that is related to the gasoline price pg  for an ethanol quantity 
less than 10 percent of the finished fuel at the ethanol price pe  and the gasoline price pg .  
Blenders are indifferent between blending any amount of ethanol less than 10 percent of the 
finished fuel at the ethanol price pe  and the gasoline price pg .  Other things being equal, 
blenders prefer ethanol to gasoline and would be willing to blend more of ethanol at an 
ethanol price pepe < .  However, because of the 10-percent-ethanol-90-percent-gasoline 
blending wall, blenders can only increase the ethanol blend level to 10 percent of the finished 
fuel at the ethanol price pepe <  and the gasoline price pg .  As a result, the derived demand 
for fuel ethanol may be considered as being downward sloping for an ethanol price lower 
than pe .  Figure 23 shows the derived demand curve for fuel ethanol where qe  is the 
ethanol quantity that is exactly equal to 10 percent of the finished fuel at the ethanol price 
pe  and the gasoline price pg .  As long as ethanol is blended at a lower level than 10-
percent-ethanol-90-percent-gasoline, the downward sloping portion of the derived demand 
may be ignored.  A comparison between the US oxygenate plant production of fuel ethanol 
and the US finished 
                                                          
38 Conventional gasoline engines are certified to operate on E10 without modification.  Unlike flexible fuel 
vehicles that can operate on any ethanol-fuel mixture with ethanol concentrations of up to 85 percent (E85), 
conventional gasoline engines do not have a sensor to detect the ethanol-fuel ratio.  So appropriate adjustments 
cannot be made to the engine’s ignition timing and air-fuel mixture ratios to optimize performance and maintain 
emissions control if ethanol-fuel mixtures other than E10 are used. 
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motor gasoline product supplied39 shows historical fuel ethanol use to be below the 10-
percent-ethanol-90-percent-gasoline blending wall.  The EIA, in its 2007 Annual Energy 
Outlook, projects fuel ethanol use to account for approximately 8 percent of the total 
fuel use in 2030.  As a result, the derived demand for fuel ethanol may be viewed simply as a 
relationship between the ethanol price and the gasoline price.  Figure 24 shows this possible 
relationship between the ethanol price and the gasoline price (Oxy Fuel News, Ethanol & 
Biodiesel News, and Energy Information Administration). 
 
 
Figure 23.  The derived demand for fuel ethanol when ethanol is viewed as being a perfect substitute for gasoline 
 
 
Figure 24.  US fuel ethanol price and US conventional gasoline price (January 1995 – October 2008) 
 
                                                          
39 Both statistics are obtained from the EIA. 
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This paper tests the hypothesis that the derived demand for fuel ethanol is perfectly 
elastic to see whether a long-run relationship exists between the ethanol price and the 
gasoline price; and in examining how the demand may have been affected by some of the 
2005 EPAct mandates and the significantly higher gasoline price in recent years, which may 
have caused a structural break in the long-run relationship between the ethanol price and the 
gasoline price.  The Johansen and Jesulius multivariate cointegration methodology is 
employed in estimating the demand, i.e. searching for the long-run relationship between the 
ethanol price and the gasoline price, while the Gregory and Hansen (1996) tests for 
cointegration in models with regime shifts are utilized to see if a long-run equilibrium 
ethanol price equation exists with a structural break.  The model is applied to an empirical 
analysis of the market between January 1995 and October 2008, the period of which the 
ethanol price data and the gasoline price data are available for the US. 
Higgins, Bryant, Outlaw, and Richardson (2006), as part of their study of US fuel 
ethanol pricing, also examine the relationship between the ethanol price and the gasoline 
price using the time series techniques of cointegration.  However, the analysis is for the 
period of June 1989 to August 2005.  Based upon the obtained long-run relationship, ethanol 
and gasoline are found to be weak substitutes.  Higgins et al. explain this weak 
substitutability as a likely result of the competing complementarity between ethanol and 
gasoline.  Serra, Zilberman, Gil, and Goodwin (2008) use daily futures prices for corn, 
ethanol, and crude oil observed from July 21, 2005 to May 15, 2007 in characterizing the 
corn-ethanol-oil price relationships.  To allow for nonlinearities in the process of price 
adjustment towards long-run relationships, smooth transition vector error correction model 
(STVECM) is used.  Though a long-run relationship is found between the ethanol, corn, and 
crude oil prices, not much attention is paid to the cointegrating vector itself.   
Studies focusing on other aspects of the time series properties of US fuel ethanol 
pricing, besides cointegration, are for example the followings.  Zhang and Wetzstein (2008), 
in addressing the food-versus-fuel issues, examine the relationships between the weekly price 
series for US ethanol, corn, conventional gasoline, and oil from the last week of March 1989 
through the first week of December 2007.  A vector autoregression (VAR) model is used to 
estimate the evolution of the price series, while a multivariate generalized autoregressive 
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conditional heteroskedasticity (MGARCH) model is used to estimate the conditional 
volatilities of the log price changes.  Zhang, Vedenov, and Wetzstein (2007) develop a 
structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model of the US fuel ethanol market to evaluate the 
validity of the limit-price hypothesis on the part of MTBE refiners as an explanation of the 
lack of ethanol entry into the US fuel-additives market before MTBE bans.  Other studies of 
the US fuel ethanol market that may be of some interest include Elobeid and Tokgoz (2006) 
which uses a multi-market international ethanol model calibrated on 2005 market data and 
policies to study the impact of the US trade liberalization and removal of federal ethanol tax 
credit on the US and Brazilian ethanol markets. 
This paper is organized as follows.  The next section presents econometric 
methodology and specifies model used in finding a long-run relationship between the ethanol 
price and the gasoline price.  Section 3 checks whether the time series are integrated of the 
same order as required by the concept of cointegration.  Section 4 reports results from testing 
the null hypothesis of no cointegration.  Section 5 tests if a cointegrating relationship 
between the ethanol price and the gasoline price exists with a structural break.  Section 6 
concludes.    
2  Econometric Methodology and Model Specification 
Since this paper explores relationships among time series variables, it is necessary to 
first check if the time series variables are stationary.  Spurious relationships may be 
encountered when running a regression involving two or more non-stationary time series 
variables.  However, if the non-stationary time series variables are integrated of the same 
order, it is possible that their linear combination is stationary.  When their linear combination 
is stationary, the non-stationary time series variables of interest are said to be cointegrated 
(Engle & Granger, 1980).  Unit root tests are employed in testing whether the time series 
variables are stationary and ensuring that they have the same order of integration in case they 
are non-stationary. 
After checking that the time series variables have the same order of integration, the 
next step is to check whether they are cointegrated.  This is done using the Johansen and 
Jesulius multivariate cointegration methodology.  Unlike the Engle and Granger residual-
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based test for cointegration, the Johansen and Jesulius methodology allows for possibility of 
having more than one cointegrating vector among the time series variables of interest and for 
inferences to be made on the parameters.40  It is the preferred methodology reported by 
Higgins et al. (2006) in finding cointegrating relationships. 
Let tY  be a 1×K  vector of the time series variables of interest that are integrated of 
the same order )1(I .  A vector error correction model (VECM) of the form 
 ∑−
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+ΔΓ++′=Δ
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tititt YYY εμβα                                                               (1) 
 is employed so that the Johansen and Jesulius methodology can be carried out.  β  is a rK ×  
matrix of parameters corresponding to the cointegrating relationships among the time series 
variables tY .  μ  is an 1×r  vector of constants that are also part of the cointegrating 
relationships.  α  is a rK ×  matrix of parameters corresponding to the short-run adjustments 
to the time series variables tY  given a departure from the long-run relationships.  1Γ , …, 
1−Γp  are KK ×  matrices of parameters.  tε  is a 1×K  vector of normally distributed errors 
that are serially uncorrelated but have contemporaneous covariance matrix Ω .  p  is chosen 
based on the information criteria obtained from running a VAR model that underlies the 
above VECM (1).  It is the number of lags used in the underlying VAR.   
Engle and Granger (1987) shows that if the time series variables tY  are cointegrated, 
the matrices β  and α  in (1) have rank Kr <<0  where r  is the number of linearly 
independent cointegrating vectors.  If, on the other hand, the time series variables tY  are not 
cointegrated, the cointegration rank r  equals zero.  The trace statistic, based on the Johansen 
and Jesulius maximum likelihood estimator of the parameters of a cointegrating VECM (1), 
is used to determine the cointegration rank r . 
Given the number of lags p  and the cointegration rank r , (1) is fitted using 
maximum likelihood methods.  The log-likelihood function for (1) can be maximized more 
easily by concentrating it in the following form
                                                          
40 The Engle and Granger approach results in inefficient estimation of the existing cointegrating relationship 
(Campiche, Bryant, Richardson, & Outlaw, 2006). 
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where T  is the sample size; tt YZ Δ=0  is 1×K ; ( )′′= − 1,11 tt YZ  is 1)1( ×+K ; 
( )′′Δ′Δ= +−− 112 ,..., pttt YYZ  is 1)1( ×−pK ; ( )11 ,..., −ΓΓ= pψ  is )1( −× pKK ; and ( )′′= μββ ,~  is 
rK ×+ )1( .  Johansen (1995) shows how ψ  can be expressed analytically in terms of α , β , 
and the data so that (2) is concentrated further as follows   
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T
t
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1 , }2,1,0{, ∈ji ; ttt ZMMZR 2
1
220200
−
−=  is the residuals obtained 
from the regression of tZ 0  on tZ 2 ; and ttt ZMMZR 2
1
221211
−
−=  is the residuals obtained 
from the regression of tZ1  on tZ 2 .  Although the estimate of βα ′~  is obtained from (3), not 
all the parameters in α  and β~  are identified.  This is because the product of Qα  and 
β ′− ~1Q , where Q  is a nonsingular rr ×  matrix , produces the same value βα ′~ .  So 
substituting  Qαα =
~~  and ββ ′=′ − ~~~ 1Q  into (3) for α  and β~  would not change the value of 
the log likelihood.  To identify α  and β~ , some a priori identification restrictions are 
required.  Johansen (1995) proposes a normalization method that places 2r  linearly 
independent restrictions         
 ( )ββ ′=′ (,~ rI                                                                                                     (4) 
, where rI  is the rr ×  identity matrix and β
(
 is a rrK ×− )(  matrix of identified parameters, 
on the parameters in β~  and shows how these estimates of the identified parameters in β~  
converge at a faster rate than the estimates of the short-run parameters in α  and iΓ , allowing 
the distribution of the estimates of the short-run parameters in α  and iΓ  to be derived 
conditional on the estimated β~ .   
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For a given value of β~ , the regression of tR0  on tR1~β ′  then yields  
 ( ) 11101 )~~(~~ −′= ββββα SS                                                                                 (5) 
 ( ) 101110100 ~)~~(~~ SSSS βββββ ′′−=Ω −  
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)/1( , }1,0{, ∈ji                                                                                           
Using the solutions (5) in (3), Johansen (1995) shows that the estimates βˆ~  of the parameters 
in β~  are given by the r  eigenvectors 1v , ..., rv  corresponding to the r  largest eigenvalues 
1λ , …, rλ  that solve the generalized eigenvalue problem 
 001
1
001011 =−
− SSSSiλ                                                                                (6) 
To identify these eigenvectors 1v , …, rv , (4) is imposed.  The eigenvectors 1v , …, rv  are 
normalized such that 
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Let iλˆ  be the eigenvalues that solve (6) and (7), the log-likelihood function (3) at the 
optimum is given by   
 ( ) ( ) ( )⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−+++−= ∑
=
∗
r
i
iSKKTL
1
002
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The asymptotic distribution of βˆ~  is shown to be mixed Gaussian and the variance-
covariance (VCE) matrix of βˆ~  can be consistently estimated by 
 ( ) { } )()()ˆˆˆ()( 11111 ′⊗′⊗Ω′⊗ −−
−
JrJJJrdT HIHSHHI αα                                       (9) 
where ( )′′=
−+−+× rKrKrJ IH 1)1( ,0  is  )1()1( rKK −+×+ ; 
1
1101 )
~ˆ~ˆ(~ˆˆ −′= βββα SS  is the estimates 
of the parameters in α  conditional on βˆ~ ; 1000 ~ˆˆˆ SS βα ′−=Ω  is the estimate of Ω  conditional 
on βˆ~ ; d  is the degrees of freedom of the model calculated as the integer part of 
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Krn parms /)(
2
− ; and { })1()1( −+++= pKKrKKrnparms  is the total number of parameters 
in (1).  The estimated VCE matrix of αˆ  is given by  
 ( ) BdT Σ⊗Ω− ˆˆ1                                                                                                 (10) 
where 111 )
~ˆ~ˆ(ˆ −′=Σ ββ SB  (Stata Time-series, 2007, pp. 398).  
Since this paper examines whether a long-run relationship exists between the ethanol 
price and the gasoline price, the time series variables of interest are ( )′= ttt pgpeY .  tpe  is 
the US average fuel ethanol rack terminal price in dollars per gallon at time t  obtained from 
Oxy Fuel News41 and Ethanol & Biodiesel News.42  tpg  is the US conventional gasoline 
wholesale/resale price by refiners in dollars per gallon at time t  obtained from the EIA.43  
Both prices are observed from January 1995 to October 2008 (see Figure 24).   
3  Stationarity and Integration Properties of the Data 
The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and the Phillips-Perron (PP) test are used in 
testing for unit roots in the autoregressive representation of each individual time series 
variable ty .  The ADF test is carried out in the following context 
 tmtmttt uyyyty +Δ++Δ+++= −−− γγρδζ ...111                                                 (11) 
where tu  is an independently and identically distributed zero-mean error terms.  The lagged 
values of the difference of the time series variable 1−Δ ty , …, mty −Δ  are included in (11) to 
accommodate any serial correlation in the disturbances.  The lag length m  is chosen to 
minimize the following information criteria 
 ( ) ( )*
max
*
*
max
)(ln)( *
KmT
A
KmT
ee KmmIC
−−−−
′ ++=                                                    (12) 
where e  is the residuals obtained from (11); maxm  is the largest lag length being considered 
and equals the integer part of [ ( ) 25.010012 T ]; *K  equals one for random walk, two for random 
walk with drift, and three for trend stationary; and *A  equals two for Akaike information 
criterion (AIC) and )ln( *max KmT −−  for Schwartz Bayesian information criterion (SBIC).  
                                                          
41 See http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=32874&cfc=1 for more details. 
42 See http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=68404 for more details. 
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The null hypothesis is that the time series variable ty  has a unit root or, in the context of 
(11), ρ  equals one.  The alternative hypothesis is that ty  is stationary.  If the test statistic 
)ˆ(..
1ˆ
ρ
ρ
ErrorStdEststattADF
−
−
=  is less than the critical values, the null hypothesis is rejected and ty  
is stationary.   
The PP test is carried out in the following context  
 ttt uyty +++= −1ρδζ                                                                                 (13) 
Unlike the ADF test, any serial correlation in the disturbances is ignored in (13) but is 
accounted for in the test statistics ( )
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 is the thj  autocovariance of the 
residuals te .  If these test statistics are less than the critical values, the null hypothesis of ty  
having a unit root (i.e. 1:0 =ρH ) is rejected and ty  is stationary. 
Both the ADF test (with the lag length chosen based on AIC) and the PP test indicate 
that, at 1% and 5% significance levels, the ethanol price tpe  and the gasoline price tpg  are 
all non-stationary and can be made stationary by taking the first difference.  Therefore, they 
are integrated of the same order )1(I .  Error! Reference source not found. reports the results 
of the ADF test (i.e. note that the autoregressive representations of tpe  and of tpg  include a 
trend), while Table 4 reports the results of the PP test (i.e. note that the autoregressive 
representations of tpe  and of tpg  include a trend).  All test results are obtained from Stata 
10 output.  Significant values at 1% and 5% levels are denoted by * and ** respectively.  The 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
43 See http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/a163700002m.htm for more details. 
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autoregressive representation of tpe  and the autoregressive representation of tpg  include a 
trend.   
 
Table 3.  ADF results 
time series                        m chosen based on AIC 
 m stattADF −  1% critical value 5% critical value 
tpe  (trend) 2 -3.404 -4.019 -3.442 
tpg  (trend) 10 -1.121 -4.022 -3.443 
tpeΔ  1 -9.543*,** -2.592 -1.950 
tpgΔ  9 -4.380*,** -2.593 -1.950 
time series                      m chosen based on SBIC 
 m stattADF −  1% critical value 5% critical value 
tpe  (trend) 1 -4.289*,** -4.019 -3.441 
tpg  (trend) 1 -3.470** -4.019 -3.441 
tpeΔ  1 -9.543*,** -2.592 -1.950 
tpgΔ  0 -7.809*,** -2.591 -1.950 
   
          
Table 4.  PP results 
time  stattZ −  1% critical  5% critical  statZ −ρ  1% critical  5% critical  
series   Value value   value value 
tpe  (trend) -3.312 -4.018 -3.441 -20.837 -27.833 -20.960 
tpg  (trend) -2.869 -4.018 -3.441 -15.529 -27.833 -20.960 
tpeΔ  -8.795*,** -2.591 -1.950 -92.916*,** -13.428 -7.943 
tpgΔ  -7.595*,** -2.591 -1.950 -107.154*,** -13.428 -7.943 
 
 
4  Cointegration Analysis 
Since the ethanol price tpe  and the gasoline price tpg  are integrated of the same 
order )1(I , the Johansen and Jesulius multivariate cointegration methodology is employed to 
check if a long-run relationship exists between them.  Firstly, varsoc command in Stata 10 is 
used to select the lag length p  in the VECM (1) where ( )′= ttt pgpeY .  The lag-order
59 
selection statistics obtained from varsoc output for a series of VAR models of order 1, …, 13 
that underlie the VECM (1) where ( )′= ttt pgpeY  are reported in Table 5 (i.e. note that the 
largest lag length of 13 being considered equals the integer part of [ ( ) 25.010012 T ] where the  
number of observations T  equals 166  in this case).  Values indicating the optimal 
lag are in bold.   
 
Table 5.  Lag-order selection statistics 
varsoc pe pg, maxlag(13) noconstant    
Selection order criteria       
Sample: 1996m2 2008m10 Number of obs = 153 
Lag LL LR Df P FPE AIC HQIC SBIC 
1 164.358 . 4 . .000421 -2.09619 -2.06401 -2.01696 
2 178.902 29.087 4 0.000 .000367 -2.23402 -2.16965 -2.07556 
3 185.593 13.383 4 0.010 .000354 -2.2692 -2.17265 -2.03151 
4 188.19 5.1925 4 0.268 .000361 -2.25085 -2.12211 -1.93394 
5 188.785 1.19 4 0.880 .000378 -2.20634 -2.04542 -1.8102 
6 196.406 15.243 4 0.004 .00036 -2.25367 -2.06057 -1.77831 
7 199.017 5.2218 4 0.265 .000367 -2.23552 -2.01023 -1.68093 
8 205.422 12.809 4 0.012 .000356 -2.26695 -2.00948 -1.63313 
9 211.717 12.591 4 0.013 .000345 -2.29696 -2.00731 -1.58391 
10 221.653 19.872 4 0.001 .00032 -2.37455 -2.05271 -1.58228 
11 226.89 10.474 4 0.033 .000315 -2.39072 -2.0367 -1.51922 
12 232.974 12.169 4 0.016 .000307 -2.41796 -2.03176 -1.46724 
13 243.119 20.29 4 0.000 .000284 -2.49829 -2.0799 -1.46834 
Endogenous: pe pg     
Exogenous: _       
               
As can be seen, the Schwartz Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) chooses two lags.  The 
Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQIC) chooses three lags.  The sequential likelihood-
ratio (LR) test chooses thirteen lags.  Since the data are monthly, thirteen lags44 are selected 
in this case. 
                                                          
44 Although cointegration between the ethanol price and the gasoline price is found to exist with a structural 
break, the Johansen and Jesulius maximum likelihood estimator of the VECM (1) with the cointegrating vector 
specified as in (14) produces the estimates of the structural change parameters 3β  and 2μ  that are not 
significantly different from zero when the VECM (1) is specified with three lags (i.e. 3=p ).  When VECM 
(1) is specified with two lags (i.e. 2=p ), it is not certain if cointegration between the ethanol price and the 
gasoline price exists with a structural break even though the Gregory and Hansen (1996) tests for cointegration 
in models with regime shifts fail to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration.  This is because cointegration 
is also found in the absence of a structural break. 
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Secondly, vecrank command in Stata 10 is used to determine the cointegration rank r  
in the VECM (1) where ( )′= ttt pgpeY .  The trace statistic method implemented in 
vecrank is based on the eigenvalues 1ˆλ , …, Kλˆ  used in computing the optimum log-
likelihood function (8) and sorted from the largest 1ˆλ  to the smallest Kλˆ .  The null 
hypothesis of the trace statistic method is that there are no more than r  cointegrating 
equations in the system.  Restricting the cointegration rank to be r  or less implies that the 
remaining eigenvalues 1ˆ +rλ , …, Kλˆ  are zero.  As a result, large values of the trace statistic 
( )∑
+=
−−
K
ri
iT
1
ˆ1ln λ  are evidence against the null hypothesis that there are r  or fewer 
cointegrating equations in the system.  The trace statistic method starts testing at 0=r  and 
accepts as an estimator rˆ  of the true number of cointegrating equations the first value of r  
for which the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.  Error! Reference source not found. reports 
vecrank output for the VECM (1) where ( )′= ttt pgpeY  and the lag length p  equals 13. 
 
Table 6.  Trace statistics used in determining the cointegration rank r  
vecrank pe pg, trend(rconstant) lags(13)   
Johansen tests for cointegration    
Trend: rconstant    Number of obs = 153 
Sample: 1996m2     2008m10            lags =  13 
maximum  
rank 
Parms 
 
LL 
 
eigenvalue 
 
trace statistic 
 
5% critical  
value 
0 48 239.18949 . 16.2848 19.96 
1 52 245.55667 0.07986 3.5504 9.42 
2 54 247.33189 0.02294   
 
As the trace statistic of 16.28 is less than the 5% critical value of 19.96, the null hypothesis 
of no cointegration (i.e. cointegration rank being zero) cannot be rejected.  However, the 
failure to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration does not necessarily imply the lack of 
long-run relationship between the ethanol price tpe  and the gasoline price tpg .  The ethanol 
price and the gasoline price may be cointegrated in the sense that their linear combination 
(i.e. the cointegrating vector) is stationary but has shifted at one point in time (Gregory & 
Hansen, 1996).  In fact, the rapid growth enjoyed by the US fuel ethanol industry due to the 
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significantly higher gasoline prices and changes to the industry in recent years may lead one 
to suspect this possibility. 
5 Cointegration with Structural Break 
To check if a long-run relationship between the ethanol price and the gasoline price 
exists with a structural break, the Gregory and Hansen (1996) residual-based tests for 
cointegration in models with regime shifts are employed.  These tests are designed to test the 
null hypothesis of no cointegration against the alternative hypothesis of cointegration  in the 
presence of a possible regime shift and do not require information regarding the timing of a 
break.  Structural change is modeled using a dummy variable.  Following Gregory and 
Hansen’s procedure, a long-run equilibrium ethanol price equation which allows for a 
possible regime shift is shown below 
 ( ) tttttt sbdpgsbdpgpe ,,,2,1,,3,2 * τττττττ υμμββ ++++=                          (14) 
where tsbd ,τ  is the structural break dummy that equals one for τ≥t  and zero otherwise.  
(14) is estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) for each break point [ ]08,95 octjan∈τ  
yielding the residuals t,τˆυ .  The τADF  test statistic associated with each break point τ  is 
obtained from the autoregressive representation45 (11) of these residuals t,τˆυ .  The Gregory 
and Hansen (GH) test statistic is computed as [ ] ττ ADFGH octjan 08,95inf∈=  which, in this case, 
equals 52.507 −=mayADF .  Since the GH test statistic of -5.52 is smaller than the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% critical values46 of -5.47, -4.95, and -4.68, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is 
rejected.  Also because no cointegration is found in section 5, it can be concluded that the 
long-run relationship between the ethanol price and the gasoline price exists with a possible 
structural break at the estimated break point May 2007.  As can be seen in Figure 24, the 
gasoline price was below the ethanol price in the pre-May 2007 period and was above the 
ethanol price in the post-May 2007 period. 
Looking back at that time period, one can identify two potential shocks that may have
                                                          
45 Lag length is chosen to minimize AIC.  Trend is included.  
46 See Table 1 in Gregory and Hansen (1996). 
62 
caused this break in the cointegrating relationship: the 2005 EPAct and the crude oil price 
increase beginning in 2005.  The 2005 EPAct was passed and signed into law in late July 
2005.  Though not directly banning MTBE, it provided no protection for liability related to 
MTBE use, allowing MTBE liability suits to be moved to federal court.  Some blenders, in 
fears of these potential legal liabilities, may have decided to limit or stop MTBE use.47  Since 
the 2005 EPAct also eliminated the oxygenate requirement of a minimum of 2.1 weight 
percent oxygen in reformulated gasoline (i.e. a key defense against the liability suits for 
MTBE blenders), ethanol remains the main surviving fuel additive for increasing octane.  
However, because ethanol and MTBE have different physical and chemical properties, the 
substitution of ethanol for MTBE may have not replaced all of the gasoline volume lost by 
removing MTBE.48  Besides, because most MTBE was used on the East and West Coasts 
while ethanol has been largely produced in the Midwest, the substitution of ethanol for 
MTBE may have occurred slowly in these regions.  Unlike MTBE, ethanol cannot be 
blended at the refinery and distributed with gasoline through pipelines due to water 
absorption and materials incompatibilities (“MTBE fact sheet #3,” 1998).  If ethanol-blended 
gasoline is exposed to water, phase separation will occur.  In addition, ethanol can damage 
pipeline seals and even induce cracking in pipeline steel (Farrell et al., 2007).  Morrow, 
Griffin, and Matthews (2006) estimate the combined cost of transporting ethanol from 
production plants to fueling stations to be 10-13 cents per gallon over the cost of transporting 
petroleum fuels.  According to the EIA, the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil price49 
fluctuated from about $63 per barrel in May 2007 to a record high of $134 per barrel in June 
2008 due to the increase in global oil demand and the disruptions to oil supply.  The resulting 
significantly higher gasoline price may have caused blenders to increase their use of ethanol 
as a gasoline volume extender.  Figure 25 shows blenders’ decreasing use of MTBE and 
increasing use of ethanol over time (Energy Information Administration). 
                                                          
47 According to the National Petrochemical and Refiners Association (NPRA), MTBE use in reformulated 
gasoline accounted for as much as 11 percent of the reformulated gasoline supply at its peak. 
48 The NPRA indicates ethanol’s properties generally cause ethanol to replace only about 50 percent of the 
gasoline volume lost when MTBE is removed. 
49 See http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/rwtcm.htm for more details. 
63 
Now that the long-run relationship between the ethanol price and the gasoline price 
has been shown to exist with a possible structural break at the estimated break point May 
2007, the VECM (1) where ( )′= ttt pgpeY , the number of lags 13=p , and the 
cointegration rank 1=r  can be re-estimated with the presence of a structural break in the 
cointegrating equation.  The new model is   
 { } ∑
=
−−
+ΔΓ++++′=Δ
12
1
,0721,0731 )*(
i
tititmayttmaytt YsbdpgsbdYY εμμββα   (15) 
where ( )′= ttt pgpeY , α  is 12× , β  is 12× , 1μ  is scalar, 2μ  is scalar, and 3β  is scalar.  
For simplicity, it is assumed that structural break appears only in the long-run parameters β  
and μ  and has no effect on the short-run parameters50 α  and iΓ .   
 
 
Figure 25.  Blenders’ use of MTBE and ethanol (January 1993 – October 2008) 
 
However, maximizing the log-likelihood function for (15) using Andrade and Bruneau 
(2000) approach yields an estimate of 2μ  that is not significantly different from zero.  As a 
result, tmaysbd ,07  is dropped from (15) and the model becomes 
                                                          
50 Serra et al. (2008) assumes otherwise in their study of the corn-ethanol-oil price relationships within the US 
ethanol industry.  Andrade and Bruneau (2000), in a multivariate analysis of a cointegrated vectorial 
autoregressive model with structural breaks affecting the cointegrating vectors, allows for a possible regime 
shift in both the short-run and the long-run parameters.  
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Andrade and Bruneau (2000) shows that the log-likelihood function for (16) can also 
be concentrated in form (3), however, with the following notations differently defined  
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=′ ttmayttt pgsbdpgpeZ                                  
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Solving the generalized eigenvalue problem51 (6) noting that { }1,0,, ∈jiSij  are as defined in 
(5), { }1,0, ∈iRit  are as defined in (3), and { }2,1,0, ∈jZ jt  are as defined in (17); and imposing 
(7), one obtains the estimates of the cointegrating parameters in (16).  Based on these 
estimates, the long-run relationship between the ethanol price and the gasoline price52 is  
 ( )
)0740.0(,07)0588.0()0774.0(
5697.0*1977.09188.0 +−= ttmaytt pgsbdpgpe                                   (18) 
(18) shows how the ethanol price tracks the gasoline price.  Alternatively, it provides an 
estimate of the long-run equilibrium ethanol price and breaks down into the pre-May 2007 
equation 
 5697.09188.0 += tt pgpe  for 07mayt <                                                      (19) 
and the post-May 2007 equation 
 5697.07211.0 += tt pgpe  for 07mayt ≥                                                      (20) 
If ethanol was valued based on its energy content (i.e. which is roughly two-thirds that of 
gasoline) alone, the ethanol price would have to be roughly two-thirds the price of gasoline 
for blenders to be indifferent between blending any amount of ethanol less than the 10-
percent-ethanol-90-percent-gasoline blending ratio.  In Figure 23, pe  would have to be 
roughly two-thirds the price of gasoline if ethanol was valued based on its energy content 
                                                          
51 vec command in Stata 10 can only be used in the absence of structural break. 
52 Standard errors of the coefficients are in parentheses and are obtained from (9). 
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alone.  However, because ethanol is also used as an octane enhancer53, the ethanol price pe  
may be above two-thirds the price of gasoline.  Note that the octane enhancing value of 
ethanol is partially offset by the negative value of ethanol’s high vapor pressure and water 
absorption (“Review of market,” 2000).  Tax benefits and incentive programs, such as the 
federal Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit (VEETC) of $0.45 per gallon of ethanol 
blended into gasoline54 and varying supplemental state subsidies55 for ethanol use, may also 
add to the positive margin between the ethanol price pe  and the fuel value of ethanol.  As 
long as ethanol is used mainly as a gasoline volume extender and its use does not exceed the 
10-percent-ethanol-90-percent-gasoline blending ratio, the ethanol price should be close to 
the fuel value of ethanol plus the value of the tax benefits and incentive programs in place.  
The constant term in the long-run equilibrium ethanol price equation (18) captures the value 
of the tax benefits and incentive programs and is equal to $0.57 per gallon of ethanol in both 
the pre-May 2007 and the post-May 2007 periods.  Since the ethanol price in excess of the 
federal and state tax credits is shown in (19) to be significantly above the fuel value of 
ethanol and historical fuel ethanol use accounted for less than 10 percent of the finished fuel 
in the pre-May 2007 period, (19) is simply an estimate of the long-run equilibrium ethanol 
price and not an estimate of the perfectly elastic derived demand for fuel ethanol pe .  It also 
follows that the demand for fuel ethanol in the pre-May 2007 period is largely governed by 
government regulations such as the 1990 CAAA oxygenate requirements for oxygenated and 
reformulated gasoline.  The low gasoline price provides little incentive for blenders’ use of 
ethanol as a gasoline volume extender despite the tax benefits and incentive programs in 
place.  The estimate of the coefficient of the gasoline price in (19) of 0.92 is much higher 
                                                          
53 According to the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), 10% blend of ethanol in gasoline raises 
the octane number by 2.5 points.  The value of an octane gallon (i.e. the value in excess of the price of a gallon 
of regular gasoline that a refiner would pay for a gallon of gasoline blending component having a blending 
octane number one number higher than the refinery’s average output) is shown to be $0.0071 - $0.0143 per 
octane gallon.   
54 The federal tax credit was $0.54 per gallon for ethanol use prior to January 1, 2005 and was $0.51 per gallon 
for ethanol use from January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2008.  On January 1, 2009, it was reduced further to 
$0.45 per gallon for ethanol use. 
55 Several states provide reductions or exemptions for ethanol from motor fuel excise or sales taxes, the largest 
of which appear to be in Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa (Koplow & Steenblik, 2008).  See 
http://www.afdc.energy.gov/afdc/ethanol/incentives_laws.html for more details. 
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than Higgins et al.’s (2006) estimate of the coefficient of the gasoline price56 of 0.08.  The 
difference may come from Higgins et al.’s inclusion of the period prior to 1995 in their study 
of the cointegrating relationship between the ethanol price and the gasoline price over the 
period of June 1989 to August 2005.  Prior to 1995, monthly fuel ethanol use is shown to be 
most of the time below 100 million gallons in Error! Reference source not found..  Tyner’s 
(2007) estimates of the relationship between the ethanol price and the gasoline price for the 
entire period 1982 – 2006 and for the separate periods 1982 – 2001 and 2002 – 2006 are also 
different from the estimate of the long-run equilibrium ethanol price (19).  However, these 
estimates are not cointegrating relationships. 
On the other hand, since the ethanol price in excess of the federal and state tax credits 
is shown in (20) to be close to the fuel value of ethanol and historical fuel ethanol use 
accounted for less than 10 percent of the finished fuel in the post-May 2007 period, (20) 
provides not only an estimate of the long-run equilibrium ethanol price but also an estimate 
of the perfectly elastic derived demand for fuel ethanol pe .  The significantly higher 
gasoline price in the post-May 2007 period may have increased blenders’ use of ethanol as a 
gasoline volume extender.  The increased use of ethanol as a gasoline volume extender, 
together with the MTBE phase-out and the repeal of the oxygenate requirement for 
reformulated gasoline (which made ethanol the main fuel additive for increasing octane), 
may have caused the ethanol price in excess of the tax credits in the post-May 2007 period to 
become close to the fuel value of ethanol.  Given that the market operates in the perfectly 
elastic portion (20) of the derived demand for fuel ethanol, it follows that changes in the 
market equilibrium price of ethanol in the post-May 2007 period come primarily from 
changes in the derived demand for fuel ethanol. 
6  Conclusions 
This paper tests the hypothesis that the derived demand for fuel ethanol is perfectly 
elastic to see whether a long-run relationship exists between the ethanol price and the 
gasoline price over the period from January 1995 to October 2008.  A VECM is used so that 
the Johansen and Jesulius multivariate cointegration methodology is carried out.  The 
                                                          
56 No estimate of the constant term in the cointegrating relationship is provided by Higgins et al. (2006).  
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cointegration analysis finds no cointegration between the ethanol price and the gasoline 
price.  However, this failure to find cointegration does not necessarily imply the lack of long-
run relationship between the ethanol price and the gasoline price.  The ethanol price and the 
gasoline price may be cointegrated in the sense that their linear combination (the 
cointegrating vector) is stationary but has shifted at one point in time (Gregory & Hansen, 
1996).  In fact, the GH residual-based tests for cointegration in models with regime shifts 
indicate that the long-run relationship between the ethanol price and the gasoline price exists 
with a possible structural break at the estimated break point May 2007.  The MTBE phase-
out, the repeal of the oxygenate requirement for reformulated gasoline, and the significantly 
higher gasoline price in the post-May 2007 period may have caused this break in the 
cointegrating relationship.  Based on the obtained cointegrating relationship, the demand for 
fuel ethanol in the pre-May 2007 period is largely governed by government regulations such 
as the 1990 CAAA oxygenate requirements for oxygenated and reformulated gasoline, while 
the demand for fuel ethanol in the post-May 2007 period is perfectly elastic.  Given that the 
market operates in the perfectly elastic portion of the derived demand for fuel ethanol, it 
follows that changes in the market equilibrium price of ethanol come primarily from changes 
in the derived demand for fuel ethanol.  The linkage between the ethanol price and the 
gasoline price should prove useful for decision makers involved in the industry and policy 
makers in formulating biofuel and energy policy.  
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CHAPTER 4.  WATER RECYCLING IN FUEL ETHANOL PLANT 
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Abstract 
Among options available to help reduce some of the ethanol pressure on the (ground) 
water resources is water recycling in ethanol plants.  Although modern ethanol plants possess 
sophisticated water treatment techniques for water recycling, water recycling is done only 
when it is cheaper than obtaining water from the outside source.  Since water recycling can 
lower the cost of production, it may adversely induce production expansion and lead to more 
outside water being used by the plants.  This paper examines the conditions under which this 
possibility occurs. 
1  Introduction 
Over the past decade, US fuel ethanol industry has been growing at a rapid rate, with 
more than 9.2 billion gallons of fuel ethanol produced in 2008 as compared with 1.1 to 1.47 
billion gallons produced57 annually between 1992 and 1997.  The number of production 
facilities has grown from 50 operating plants in 1999 (Young & Briggs, 2007) to about 145 
plants currently operating in 26 states (Wilkins, 2008).  The growing demand for fuel ethanol 
comes largely from the need for gasoline substitutes as gasoline prices increase and crude oil 
supplies become less available; from the need for cleaner-burning fuel as concerns over 
carbon emissions intensify; and from the need for alternative fuel oxygenates to replace 
Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) recognized by the US Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) as a potential ground water pollutant.  Federal and state incentive programs, 
such as tax credits; oxygenate requirements; and renewable fuel standard (RFS) mandating 
biofuel use, were set up to promote fuel ethanol use.  Advancements in the production 
technology also play an important role in the industry expansion.   
                                                          
57 See http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/m_epooxe_yop_nus_1m.htm for more details. 
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Currently, ethanol is primarily produced from corn58 in the US.  In addition to water 
required to grow corn, a considerable amount of water is required to produce ethanol.  
According to Keeney and Muller (2006), a typical corn-based ethanol plant uses 
approximately 3.5 to 6 gallons of water for every gallon of ethanol produced.  The 
considerable amount of water required for the production together with the dramatic industry 
expansion raises concerns about potential impacts on water supplies.  The National Research 
Council (NRC), in its report on water implications of biofuel production59, addresses these 
water quantity concerns and identifies opportunities for water saving.  Among the less costly 
and difficult methods to implement is water recycling in ethanol plants.  Although modern 
ethanol plants possess sophisticated water treatment techniques for water recycling, water 
recycling is done only when it is cheaper than obtaining water from the outside source.  
Since water recycling can lower the cost of production, it may adversely induce production 
expansion and lead to more outside water being used by the plants.  When this occurs, water 
recycling may no longer be beneficial in reducing the growing pressure from the ethanol 
plants on the water resources.   
While rising attention has recently been directed toward water recycling in fuel 
ethanol plant, waste recycling has been the subject of many studies for quite some time.  For 
instance, Anderson (1977) examines the principal economic arguments behind recycling 
incentives and via the use of econometric models of secondary material markets evaluates the 
projected impacts of recycling subsidies proposed in H.R. 148 and H.R. 10612 on the 
quantity of material recycled.  Sigman (1995) provides a structural analysis of recycling 
policies possibly used to reduce environmental costs from waste disposal when direct 
disposal restrictions are difficult to enforce.  A comparison of the policies in terms of their 
cost-effectiveness in reducing disposal is made using a partial equilibrium framework.  An 
automobile-battery lead recycling example is used in examining the effects of these policies 
empirically.  Hong and Adams (1999) investigates the effects of changes in solid waste 
                                                          
58 Cellulose-based ethanol from trees, grasses, and crop wastes is not yet profitable on a large scale due to its 
current poor conversion efficiency.  According to the National Research Council (NRC), the water 
requirements for cellulose-based ethanol production are projected to be approximately 2 to 6 gallons of water 
for every gallon of cellulose-based ethanol produced.  However, less water may be required to grow cellulosic 
crops than to grow corn.       
59 See http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12039&page=R1 for more details. 
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disposal service fees and household characteristics on solid waste generation and recycling 
rates under a block pricing system, using individual household data from Portland, Oregon.  
Households are assumed to first decide on weekly disposal volume for which to contract 
based on the expected amount of solid waste generated.  They then decide on the amount of 
randomly produced total waste to recycle so that the weekly contracted volume is met.  The 
ordered probit estimation method is used to estimate the volume choice model; while the 
two-stage estimation technique is used to estimate the demand equation for waste collection 
services.   
However, these studies focus on recycling as a means of public waste reduction and 
do not deal explicitly with savings in natural resources used in the production of 
commodities which may arise from recycling.  An exception is Smith (1972) who looks at a 
dynamic social optimization model of waste reuse where a representative household 
maximizes utility subject to a set of constraints over a continuous time, infinite horizon.  
Utility is obtained from commodity consumption whereas undesirable residues such as 
container units are created as consumption by-products.  It is assumed that these container 
units can be recycled into the productive system at a cost in terms of a utility loss to the 
household.  Container units not recycled are disposed and replaced by newly produced units.  
The prevailing stock of waste at each time enters the utility function as a bad and degrades at 
a certain rate.  The stock of unrecovered raw material for commodities and containers is 
included in the model as another state variable to account for savings in natural resources 
which may arise from recycling. 
This paper examines the possibility of water recycling in a corn-based fuel ethanol 
plant leading to more outside water being used by the plant due to production expansion.  A 
static model of fuel ethanol production where a representative ethanol plant maximizes its 
profit subject to a set of constraints is used in making a comparison between the amount of 
outside water withdrawn by the plant when there is no water recycling and the amount of 
outside water withdrawn by the plant when there is water recycling.  Alternative recycling 
incentives and their impacts on outside water use are also considered.   
This paper is organized as follows.  The next section provides background on ethanol 
production and water use.  The third section presents a static model of a profit-maximizing 
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ethanol plant.  The fourth section gives optimal rules for water use by the plant.  The fifth 
section compares the amount of outside water withdrawn by the plant when there is no water 
recycling with the amount of outside water withdrawn by the plant when there is water 
recycling.  The sixth section concludes. 
2  Ethanol Production and Water Use 
In the US, ethanol is primarily produced from corn via dry mill process (see Figure 
26) where the entire corn kernels are ground into flour or cornmeal and processed without 
being separated into component parts.60  The cornmeal is mixed with water and is pH 
adjusted.  Enzymes are added to convert starch to sugar.  The mixture is cooked at a high 
temperature before it is cooled and transferred to fermentation tanks.  Yeast is added to 
convert sugar to ethanol and carbon dioxide.  After 40 to 60 hours of fermentation, the 
fermented product is pumped into a distillation system where ethanol is separated from 
stillage (i.e. non-fermentable solids and water).  The resulting 190-proof ethanol containing 
approximately 5% water is then passed through a molecular sieve system to remove the 
remaining water and to obtain the 200-proof anhydrous ethanol.  A small amount of 
denaturant is added before the ethanol is shipped to gasoline terminals or retailers, making it 
unfit for human consumption and thus not subject to beverage alcohol tax.  The stillage from 
the bottom of the distillation tanks is sent to centrifuges for separation into wet distillers 
grains (WDGs) and thin stillage.  Some of the thin stillage may be routed back to the cooker 
for reuse as process water while the rest is concentrated via evaporation into high-protein-fat 
syrup.  The syrup is added back to WDGs which may later be dried to obtain dried distillers 
grains (DDGs).  Distillers grains can be used to feed livestock.  Carbon dioxide released 
during fermentation can be captured and purified for use in carbonated beverages and flash-
freezing applications.
                                                          
60 Another method used to produce corn ethanol is wet milling where the corn kernels are separated into 
component parts (e.g. starch, protein, germ, oil, kernel fibers, etc.) prior to fermentation.  See “How ethanol is 
made” for more details.  
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Figure 26.  Corn-based dry milling ethanol production 
Sources: http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12039&page=46 
 
As can be seen, water is one of the key inputs in the ethanol production.  In addition 
to being used as process water, it is also used as boiler water and cooling water in the plant’s 
utility systems.  Water can come into the plant from either nearby rivers or ground water 
sources.  The plant may rely primarily on ground water which is typically readily available 
and of higher quality than surface water61 (Mowbray & Hume, 2007).  Thus, ethanol plants 
can present local (or regional) water problems if they are located where the water resources 
are already under stress.  Many options are available to help reduce water consumption by an 
ethanol plant.  They include switching from a wet cooling tower to a dry cooling tower, 
installing a high efficiency dryer, and using alternative technologies to distillation such as 
pervaporation.  Some of these new plant designs may even reduce water consumption down 
to 1.5 gallons per gallon of ethanol produced.  However, they may be expensive to 
implement at existing plants.62  Among the less costly and difficult methods to implement is 
water recycling where waste water from the production (i.e. used process water, used boiler 
                                                          
61 Water quality can affect the cooking process and may account for scaling and corrosion in the plant’s heating 
and cooling systems. 
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water, and used cooling water) is put back to use.  Since water loss or consumptive use of 
water may occur from evaporation, not all of the water used in the production ends up as 
waste water which can be recycled or discharged. 
3  Model 
The paper focuses on a basic model of fuel ethanol production where an ethanol plant 
uses outside water ow  and recycled water rw  to produce ethanol.63  Water recycling is 
considered as a continuous flow process.  Outside water and recycled water are assumed 
perfect substitutes in the production function ( ).f .64  Processes such as filtration and 
methanation may be used to remove leftover solids and organic matters in recycled water.  
An ethanol output is ( )rwowf + .  As the plant may be subject to an output constraint such as 
nameplate capacity, it is assumed that the output ( )rwowf +  cannot be greater than the 
amount Q .  Due to evaporation, not all inlet water ends up as waste water after use.  So the 
amount of waste water available for recycling is owα  where 10 << α .  Since it is assumed 
that recycled water is treated before it is reused, the marginal cost of water recycling (i.e. the 
marginal cost of treating recycled water) may be viewed as being constant and is denoted by 
rwC  in this case.  Assuming waste water can either be recycled or discharged, the amount of 
waste water discharged is rwow −α .  Since discharged water has to meet quality standards 
set by the governments, let’s assume that it is treated prior to being released into the streams 
at a per unit cost dC .   
Let eP  be a per unit price of ethanol; let owP  be a per unit price of outside water;65 
and let all the markets be perfectly competitive, the profit maximization problem of the plant 
may be expressed as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
62 See Jessen (2007) for more details. 
63 Other factors of production can be added to the model without changing the analysis. 
64 The quality difference between outside water and recycled water may be accounted for in the model by the 
use of different extraction costs for different sources of water.   
65 owP  could also be thought of as the price of water obtained from city utilities. 
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4  Optimal Rules 
The Lagrangian for system (1) is: 
 
( ) { }
{ } ( ){ } ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
+−+−+
−−−−+
=
rwowfQrwow
rwowCrwCowPrwowfP
L
drwowe
βαλ
α
        (2)                       
where 0, ≥βλ .  The necessary conditions for an optimal solution are: 
 ( ) ( ) 0,0,0 =≥≤−+−−= ∂∂∂
+∂
∂
+∂
∂
∂ owowCPP owLow
rwowfdow
ow
rwowfe
ow
L βλαα               (3) 
 ( ) ( ) 0,0,0 =≥≤−−+−= ∂∂∂
+∂
∂
+∂
∂
∂ rwrwCCP rwLrw
rwowfdrw
rw
rwowfe
rw
L βλ              (4) 
 0,0,0 =≥≥−= ∂∂∂∂ λλα λλ LL rwow                         (5) 
 ( ) 0,0,0 =≥≥+−= ∂∂∂∂ ββ ββ LL rwowfQ                                                            (6) 
Since recycled water rw  cannot exceed waste water from the production owα , the plant 
always uses outside water (i.e. 0>ow ), or else no ethanol would be produced.  As a result, 
the following is obtained from (3): 
 ( ) ( )ow
rwowfdow
ow
rwowfe CPP ∂
+∂
∂
+∂ ++=+ βαλα              (7) 
(7) has that the marginal benefits of using outside water must equal the marginal costs.  The 
marginal benefits break down into the marginal value product of outside water ( ( )ow
rwowfeP ∂
+∂ ) 
and the benefit of having α  more units of waste water to recycle (λα ).  The marginal costs 
break down into the per unit cost of outside water ( owP ), the cost of having α  more units of 
waste water to discharge ( αdC ), and the cost of using outside water associated with a 
( )
ow
rwowf
∂
+∂  unit increase in output arising from the quantity constraint ( ) Qrwowf ≤+  
( ( )ow
rwowf
∂
+∂β ). 
If owrw α<<0 , one has from (5) that 0=λ .  From (4), the following is obtained:  
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(8) has that the marginal benefits of using recycled water must equal the marginal costs.  The 
marginal benefits break down into the marginal value product of recycled water ( ( )rw
rwowfeP ∂
+∂ ) 
and the per unit cost of discharge saved by recycling an additional unit of waste water ( dC ).  
The marginal costs break down into the per unit cost of water recycling ( rwC ) and the cost of 
using recycled water associated with a ( )rw
rwowf
∂
+∂  unit increase in output arising from the 
quantity constraint ( ) Qrwowf ≤+  ( ( )rw rwowf ∂ +∂β ).  It is then obtained from (7), (8), and 
( ) ( )
rw
rwowf
ow
rwowf
∂
+∂
∂
+∂
=  that:   
 αdowdrw CPCC +=−                    (9) 
(9) states that the net cost of recycled water, i.e. the marginal cost of water recycling ( rwC ) 
minus the discharge cost saved by recycling water ( dC ), must equal the net cost of outside 
water, i.e. the per unit cost of outside water ( owP ) plus the cost of having α  more units of 
waste water to discharge ( αdC ), for the plant to recycle some of its waste water. 
If 0=rw , one has from (5) that 0=λ .  From (4), the following is obtained: 
 ( ) ( )rw
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rw
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∂
∂
∂ +≤+ β                  (10) 
(10) has that the marginal benefits of using recycled water must be less than or equal to the 
marginal costs.  It is then obtained from (7), (10), ( ) ( )rw
rwowf
ow
rwowf
∂
+∂
∂
+∂
= , and 0=rw  that:                                     
 αdowdrw CPCC +≥−                 (11) 
(11) states that the net cost of recycled water must be greater than or equal to the net cost of 
outside water for recycled water to not be used. 
If owrw α= , one has from (5) that 0≥λ .  From (4), the following is obtained: 
 ( ) ( )rw
owowfrwd
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∂
+∂ ++=+ αα βλ                        (12) 
Note that λ  is the shadow price of waste water available for recycling.  (12) has that the 
marginal benefits of using recycled water must equal the marginal costs.  It is then obtained 
from (7), (12), ( ) ( )rw
rwowf
ow
rwowf
∂
+∂
∂
+∂
= , and owrw α=  that:   
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(13) implies the following: 
 αdowdrw CPCC +≤−                (14) 
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(14) states that the net cost of recycled water must be less than or equal to the net cost of 
outside water for the plant to recycle all of its waste water. 
In order to examine whether water recycling leads to a reduction in the amount of 
outside water withdrawn by the plant, optimal rules are needed for outside water use before 
and after water recycling.  Section 4.1 and 4.2 below provide these rules.  
4.1  Ethanol Plant with No Water Recycling 
Let’s first assume the plant utilizes no water recycling ( 0=rw );66 that is initially 
assuming the net cost of recycled water is greater than the net cost of outside water as in 
(11).  If the output constraint holds with strict inequality, (6) implies 0=β .  As a result, (7) 
becomes the following: 
 ( ) αdowowowfe CPP
A
+=∂
∂ *  where ( ) Qowf A <*                                            (15) 
(15) is an implicit equation for Aow* .  Superscript *A denotes optimality in this case.   
However, if the output constraint holds with equality, one has from (7) that: 
 ( ) ( )owowfBdowowowfe
BB
CPP ∂
∂
∂
∂ ++=
** *βα  where ( )Qfow B 1* −=                         (16)  
Since the water use is fixed at ( )Qfow B 1* −= , (16) provides an implicit equation for 
0* >Bβ .  Superscript *B denotes optimality in this case.  
4.2 Ethanol Plant with Water Recycling 
Other things being equal, since it is assumed in section 3.1 that 
αdowdrw CPCC +≥− , the plant has no reason to recycle water unless there is a decrease in 
the net cost of recycled water or an increase in the net cost of outside water.  The plant may 
not take into account other uses of water when deciding how much outside water to 
withdraw.  As a result, Aow*  and Bow*  in section 4.1 may not be socially optimal.  Figure 27 
and Figure 28 illustrate this externality problem67 when the plant uses ( )Qfow A 1* −<  and 
( )Qfow B 1* −=  of outside water respectively in the absence of water recycling.  MB  is the 
marginal benefit of using water to produce ethanol, MPC  is the marginal private cost, and 
MSC  is the marginal social cost.  Sw  is the socially optimal use of water to produce ethanol 
                                                          
66 In other words, let’s assume the plant discharges all of it waste water and that discharged water meets quality 
standards set by the EPA.  
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when other uses of water are also taken into account.  The difference between MSC  and 
MPC  is the user cost of (ground) water in ethanol production (i.e. the cost of using water to 
produce ethanol in terms of forgone other uses of water). 
 
 
Figure 27.  Externality problem when the plant uses ( )Qfow A 1* −<  on its own 
 
 
Figure 28.  Externality problem when the plant uses ( )Qfow B 1* −=  on its own 
 
By moving to the internalized solution Sw , the community gains an area A  more than the 
plant loses in Figure 27 and an area B  in Figure 28.   
The government, in attempt to alleviate some of the ethanol pressure on the (ground) 
water resources, may provide incentives to reduce outside water use.68 
• Since the plant tends to overuse outside water, the government may impose a  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
67 See Just, Hueth, and Schmitz (2004) for discussion of externalities and the approach of internalization. 
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Pigouvian tax on outside water use.69  Let T  be the tax on outside water.  Since T  
raises the marginal private cost of using outside water αdow CP + , the plant produces 
less ethanol and therefore uses less outside water.  The amount of outside water used 
by the plant can be reduced even further due to water recycling. 
• In case a tax cannot be imposed on outside water use (e.g. due to cities competing for 
ethanol plants), the government may subsidize water recycling.70  Let S  be the 
subsidy for water recycling.  Since S  leaves the marginal private cost of using 
outside water αdow CP +  unchanged while lowering the net cost of recycled water 
drw CC −  and if the marginal benefit ( )w
wfeP ∂
∂  remains the same, the plant produces 
the same amount of ethanol but uses less outside water due to water recycling.  In this 
sense, a subsidy for water recycling tends to be less efficient that a tax on outside 
water use.    
Depending on the magnitude of the policy used by the government, the plant may recycle 
some or all of its waste water: 
 
Ethanol Plant Recycling Some of Its Waste Water   
Let Θ  be such that αdowdrw CPCC +=Θ−−  where T=Θ  if the government taxes 
outside water use and S=Θ  if the government subsidizes water recycling.  Since the net 
cost of recycled water now equals the net cost of outside water, the plant recycles some of its 
waste water in this case.  One then has from (5) that 0=λ .  Let’s assume diminishing 
marginal productivity of water (i.e. ( ) rwoww
dw
wfd +=< ,02
2
).  If the output constraint holds 
with strict inequality in section 3.1, depending on what type of policy Θ  is, (7) becomes the 
following: 
• If Θ  is a per unit tax on outside water,  
 ( ) TCPP dowowrwowfe
AA
++=∂
+∂ α
1**1**
                                               (17) 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
68 See Baumol and Oates (1988) for the efficiency properties of effluent fees. 
69 See Miranda, Everett, Blume, and Roy (1994) for the use of market-based incentives to encourage both 
source reducing and waste diversion in dealing with residential municipal solid waste. 
70 See Anderson (1977) and Sigman (1995) for the use of recycling subsidies when direct restrictions on 
disposal are difficult to enforce. 
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 where ( ) Qrwowf AA <+ 1**1**  and  
 superscript **A1 denotes optimality in this case.  
• If Θ  is a per unit subsidy for water recycling, 
 ( ) αdowowrwowfe CPP
AA
+=∂
+∂ 2**2**                                       (18) 
 where ( ) Qrwowf AA <+ 2**2**  and  
 superscript **A2 denotes optimality in this case. 
(17) and (18) are implicit equations for 1**1** AA rwow +  and 2**2** AA rwow +  respectively.  
Since Θ  raises the marginal costs of using outside water αdow CP +  in (17) by the amount 
T  and leaves αdow CP +  unchanged in (18), the output constraint continues to hold with 
strict inequality in the presence of water recycling regardless of the policy choice Θ .   
However, if the output constraint holds with equality in section 3.1, depending on 
what type of policy Θ  is and the magnitude of Θ , the output constraint may not continue to 
hold with equality in the presence of water recycling.  One has from (7) that:   
• If Θ  is a per unit tax on outside water, 
¾ ( ) TCPP dowow rwowfe
aBaB
++=∂
+∂ α
1**1**
                                     (19) 
 where ( ) Qrwowf aBaB <+ 1**1** , ( )owowfB BT ∂∂> **β , and  
 superscript **B1a denotes optimality in this case. 
¾ ( ) ( )dowrwowfbBdowowrwowfe
bBbBbBbB
TCPP
1**1**1**1** 1** +∂
∂
+∂ +++= βα           (20) 
 where ( )Qfrwow bBbB 11**1** −=+ , ( )owowfB BT ∂∂< **β , and  
 superscript **B1b denotes optimality in this case. 
• If Θ  is a per unit subsidy for water recycling, 
 ( ) ( )owrwowfBdowow rwowfe
BBBB
CPP ∂
+∂
∂
+∂ ++=
2**2**2**2** 2**βα                              (21) 
 where ( )Qfrwow BB 12**2** −=+  and  
 superscript **B2 denotes optimality in this case. 
(19) is an implicit equation for aBaB rwow 1**1** + .  Since the total water use is fixed at 
( )Qf 1− , (20) and (21) provide implicit equations for 01** >bBβ  and 02** >Bβ . 
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Ethanol Plant Recycling All of Its Waste Water 
Let Θ  be such that αdowdrw CPCC +<Θ−−  where τ=Θ  if the government taxes 
outside water use and S=Θ  if the government subsidizes water recycling.  Since the net 
cost of recycled water is now lower than the net cost of outside water, the plant recycles all 
of its waste water in this case.  One then has owrw α= .  As Θ  raises the opportunity cost of 
not recycling water, the shadow price of waste water available for recycling becomes 
0)1(
)()( >= +
Θ−−−+
α
αλ drwdow CCCP .  If the output constraint holds with strict inequality in section 3.1, 
depending on what type of policy Θ  is and whether the output constraint continues to hold 
with strict inequality in the presence of water recycling, (7) becomes the following: 
• If Θ  is a per unit tax on outside water, 
( ) ( ) TCPP dowTCCCPowrwowfe drwdowAA ++=+ + ++−+∂ +∂ αααα11***1***            (22) 
 where ( ) Qrwowf AA <+ 1***1***  and  
 superscript ***A1 denotes optimality in this case. 
• If Θ  is a per unit subsidy for water recycling, 
¾ ( ) ( ) αααα dowSCCCPow rwowfe CPP drwdowaAaA +=+ + ++−+∂ +∂ 12***2***       (23) 
      where ( ) Qrwowf aAaA <+ 2***2***  and 
 superscript ***A2a denotes optimality in this case. 
¾ 
( ) ( )
( ) ⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
++=
+
∂
+∂
+
++−+
∂
+∂
ow
rwowfbAdow
SCCCP
ow
rwowfe
bAbA
drwdowbAbA
CP
P
2***2***
2***2***
2***
1
βα
αα
α
                         (24) 
 where ( )α+
−
= 1
2*** 1 QfbAow , ( )αα +
−
= 1
2*** 1 QfbArw , and 
 superscript ***A2b denotes optimality in this case. 
Since the plant recycles all of its waste water in this case, (22) and (23) are implicit equations 
for 1*** Aow  and aAow 2***  respectively.  (24) provides an implicit equation for 02*** >bAβ  
respectively as the total water use is fixed at ( )Qf 1− .  Since the tax on outside water raises 
the net marginal cost of using outside water in (22) by the amount ( )ααα + ++−+− 1 TCCCP drwdowT , 
the output constraint continues to hold with strict inequality in this case.  The subsidy for 
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water recycling, on the other hand, lowers the net marginal cost of using outside water.  So it 
is possible that the output constraint holds instead with equality.   To see exactly when the 
output constraint continues to hold with strict inequality in the presence of water recycling, 
functional forms may be needed in this case.    
However, if the output constraint holds with equality in section 3.1, depending on 
what kind of policy Θ  is, one has from (7) that:   
• If Θ  is a per unit tax on outside water, 
 ( ) ( ) TCPP dowTCCCPowrwowfe drwdowBB ++=+ + ++−+∂ +∂ αααα11***1***                            (25) 
 where ( ) Qrwowf BB <+ 1***1***  and 
 superscript ***B1 denotes optimality in this case. 
• If Θ  is a per unit subsidy for water recycling, 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
++=
+
∂
+∂
+
++−+
∂
+∂
ow
rwowfBdow
SCCCP
ow
rwowfe
BB
drwdowBB
CP
P
2***2***
2***2***
2***
1
βα
αα
α
                      (26) 
 where ( )α+
−
= 1
2*** 1 QfBow , ( )αα +
−
= 1
2*** 1 QfBrw , and 
 superscript ***B2 denotes optimality in this case. 
Since the plant recycles all of its waste water in this case, (25) is an implicit equation for 
1*** Bow .  (26) provides an implicit equation for 02*** >Bβ  respectively as the total water use 
is fixed at ( )Qf 1− .   
5  Outside Water Use Before and After Water Recycling 
With the optimal rules obtained, this section examines whether water recycling leads 
to a reduction in the amount of outside water withdrawn by the plant.  A comparison is made 
between the amount of outside water withdrawn when there is no water recycling and the 
amount of outside water withdrawn when there is water recycling.  Depending on whether 
the output constraint holds with strict inequality in the absence of water recycling and 
whether the plant recycle all of its waste water in the presence of Θ , four different scenarios 
are considered: 
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Scenario 1: assuming the output constraint holds with strict inequality in the absence of 
water recycling, Scenario 1 compares the amount of outside water withdrawn when the plant 
recycles none of its waste water ( ( )Qfow A 1* −< ) with the amount of outside water 
withdrawn when the plant recycles some of its waste water ( 2,1,** =iow Ai ). 
• If Θ  is a per unit tax on outside water, given diminishing marginal productivity of 
water (i.e. ( ) rwoww
dw
wfd +=< ,02
2
), (15) and (17) yield AAA owrwow *1**1** <+  
implying AA owow *1** < .  
• If Θ  is a per unit subsidy for water recycling, (16) and (18) yield 
AAA owrwow *2**2** =+  implying AA owow *2** < .   
Since the tax on outside water raises the marginal costs of using outside water, less outside 
water is used.  The subsidy for water recycling, on the other hand, leaves the marginal costs 
of using outside water unchanged.  So the total water use remains the same.  However, 
because of water recycling, less outside water is used.  As a result, water recycling does lead 
to a reduction in the amount of outside water withdrawn by the plant regardless of the policy 
choice Θ .   
 
Scenario 2: assuming the output constraint holds with equality in the absence of water 
recycling, Scenario 2 compares the amount of outside water withdrawn when the plant 
recycles none of its waste water ( ( )Qfow B 1* −= ) with the amount of outside water 
withdrawn when the plant recycles some of its waste water ( 2,1,1,** baiow Bi = ). 
• If Θ  is a per unit tax on outside water and 
¾ if ( )owowfB
B
T ∂
∂>
**β , the output constraint holds instead with strict inequality in the 
presence of water recycling.  Given diminishing marginal productivity of water 
(i.e. ( ) rwoww
dw
wfd +=< ,02
2
), (16) and (19) yield ( )Qfowrwow BaBaB 1*1**1** −=<+  
implying BaB owow *1** < .  
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¾ if ( )owowfB
B
T ∂
∂<
**β , the output constraint continues to hold with equality in the 
presence of water recycling.  (16) and (20) yield ( ) BbBbB owQfrwow *11**1** ==+ −  
implying BbB owow *1** < .    
• If Θ  is a per unit subsidy for water recycling, since the output constraint continues to 
hold with equality in the presence of water recycling, (16) and (21) yield 
( ) BBB owQfrwow *12**2** ==+ −  implying BB owow *2** < .   
Since the tax on outside water raises the marginal costs of using outside water, less outside 
water is used.  The subsidy for water recycling, on the other hand, leaves the marginal costs 
of using outside water unchanged.  So the total water use remains fixed at ( )Qf 1− .  
However, because of water recycling, less outside water is used.  As a result, water recycling 
does lead to a reduction in the amount of outside water withdrawn by the plant regardless of 
the policy choice Θ  and whether the output constraint continues to hold with equality in the 
presence of water recycling.   
 
Scenario 3: assuming the output constraint holds with equality in the absence of water 
recycling, Scenario 3 compares the amount of outside water withdrawn when the plant 
recycles none of its waste water ( ( )Qfow B 1* −= ) with the amount of outside water 
withdrawn when the plant recycles all of its waste water ( 2,1,*** =iow Bi ). 
• If Θ  is a per unit tax on outside water, since the output constraint holds instead with 
strict inequality in the presence of water recycling, (16) and (25) yield 
( )Qfowrwow BBB 1*1***1*** −=<+  implying BB owow *1*** < .  
• If Θ  is a per unit subsidy for water recycling, since the output constraint continues to 
hold with equality in the presence of water recycling, (16) and (26) yield 
BB owow *2*** < .   
Since the tax on outside water raises the net marginal cost of using outside water, less outside 
water is used.  The subsidy for water recycling, on the other hand, lowers the net marginal 
cost of using outside water.  However, because of the output constraint, the total water use 
remains fixed at ( )Qf 1−  in the presence of the subsidy.  Since the plant recycles all of its 
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waste water, less outside water is used.  As a result, water recycling does lead to a reduction 
in the amount of outside water withdrawn by the plant regardless of the policy choice Θ  and 
whether the output constraint continue to hold with equality in the presence of water 
recycling.   
 
Scenario 4: assuming the output constraint holds with strict inequality in the absence of 
water recycling, Scenario 4 compares the amount of outside water withdrawn when the plant 
recycles none of its waste water ( ( )Qfow A 1* −< ) with the amount of outside water 
withdrawn when the plant recycles all of its waste water ( baiow Ai 2,2,1,*** = ). 
• If Θ  is a per unit tax on outside water, since the output constraint continues to hold 
with strict inequality in the presence of water recycling, (15) and (22) yield 
AAA owrwow *1***1*** <+  implying AA owow *1*** < . 
• If Θ  is a per unit subsidy for water recycling and 
¾ if the output constraint continues to hold with strict inequality in the presence of 
water recycling, given diminishing marginal productivity of water (i.e. 
( ) rwoww
dw
wfd +=< ,02
2
), (15) and (23) yield AaAaA owrwow *2***2*** >+ .  It is 
unclear whether AaA owow *2*** < .   
¾ if the output constraint holds instead with equality in the presence of water 
recycling, it is unclear from (15) and (24) whether At
bA
t owow
*2*** < .      
As can be seen, water recycling does lead to a reduction in the amount of outside water 
withdrawn when the government taxes outside water use.  This is because the tax raises the 
net marginal cost of using outside water.  As for the water recycling subsidy, since the plant 
recycles all of its waste water in this case, a unit of outside water also possesses recycling 
value.  The plant wanting to capture this recycling value may increase its use of outside 
water.  As a result, it is unclear whether water recycling leads to a reduction in the amount of 
outside water withdrawn when the government subsidizes water recycling.  To see exactly 
when water recycling leads to a reduction in the amount of outside water withdrawn when 
the government subsidizes water recycling, closed form solutions are needed so that Aow*  
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and baiow Ai 2,2,*** =  can be explicitly compared.  Finding closed form solutions requires 
assuming a functional form for the production function of ethanol.   
For illustrative purpose, let’s assume an ethanol production function of the form: 
 ( ) ( )221 lnlnlnln rwowrwowAQ ++++= γγ               (27) 
where Q  = ethanol output, A  = technology parameter, and 12 21 <+ γγ  with diminishing 
marginal productivity.  Written with Q  on the left hand side, (27) becomes: 
 ( ) 21
2
21 2ln )()( γγγγ ++ +=+= rwowAerwowAQ rwow                                             (28) 
It then follows from (15) that the amount of outside water withdrawn by the plant in the 
absence of water recycling is: 
 [ ] 2211 121 )2(* γγ
α
γγ −−
+
+
= dow
e
CP
APAow                                                                            (29) 
Depending on whether the output constraint continues to hold with strict inequality in the 
presence of water recycling, the amount of outside water withdrawn when the plant recycles 
all of its waste water in the presence of S  is: 
From (23), ( )[ ] 2211 121 )2(1 12*** γγλααγγα −−−+ ++= dowe CP APaAow  where 0)1( )()( >= + −−−+ ααλ SCCCP drwdow          (30) 
From (24), ( )( ) 221 11 12*** γγα ++= AQbAow                                     (31) 
Since by construction the output constraint holds with strict inequality in the absence of 
water recycling, one has from (29) that ( ){ } 0)2( 12121 21 >+−+ −+− γγγγα QfAPCP edow .  Note 
also that by construction [ ] SCPCC dowdrw <−−− α .  As a result, the amount of outside 
water withdrawn when the plant recycles none of its waste water ( Aow* ) and the amount of 
outside water withdrawn when the plant recycles all of its waste water in the presence of S  
( baiow Ai 2,2,*** = ) can now be explicitly compared.   
• If [ ] ( ){ } ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡+−−−< −
−+
−
+
++−+
1
12211
21
)1(
)1()2(
αα
αγγα γγα QfAPCPdowdrw
edow
CPCCS , the output constraint 
continues to hold with strict inequality in the presence of water recycling.  One has 
from (29) and (30) that water recycling leads to a reduction in the amount of outside 
water withdrawn by the plant when S  falls within the below range:
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 [ ] [ ][ ] ⎪⎭
⎪⎬⎫⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧
+
−−−
<<−−−
2,1min SS
CPCC
SCPCC
dowdrw
dowdrw αα         (32) 
 where ( ){ }1
12211
21
)1(
)1()2(1
−
−+
−
+
++−+
=
αα
αγγα γγQfAPCP edowS   
             ( ) ( ){ }21 211 11 1)(2 γγαααα −−++ −+= dow CPS  
• If [ ] ( ){ } ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡+−−−> −
−+
−
+
++−+
1
12211
21
)1(
)1()2(
αα
αγγα γγα QfAPCPdowdrw
edow
CPCCS , the output 
constraint holds instead with equality in the presence of water recycling.  One has 
from (29) and (31) that water recycling leads to a reduction in the amount of outside 
water withdrawn by the plant when ( )( ) [ ] 2211 121221 1
)1(
)2()1(
1
1 γγγγ
α
γγ
α
−−+
++
++
+ < dow
e
CPr
APr
A
Q . 
As can be seen, because the subsidy for water recycling leaves the marginal costs of using 
outside water unchanged, the plant may want to increase its outside water use so that it 
would have more water to recycle and, therefore, can obtain more subsidy.  As a result, a 
subsidy for water recycling that is too large may adversely induce production expansion and 
lead to more outside water being used by the plant. 
6  Conclusions 
Water recycling is among several options available to help reduce water consumption 
by an ethanol plant.  In an attempt to reduce some of the ethanol pressure on the water 
resources, the government may provide incentives for the plant to reduce outside water use.  
Since the plant tends to overuse outside water, the government may impose a Pigouvian tax 
on outside water use.  In case a tax cannot be imposed on outside water use, the government 
may subsidize water recycling.  Depending on whether the output constraint holds with strict 
inequality in the absence of water recycling and whether the plant ends up recycle all of its 
waste water, a comparison is made under four different scenarios between the amount of 
outside water withdrawn by the plant when there is no water recycling and the amount of 
outside water withdrawn by the plant when there is water recycling. 
Scenario 1 assumes the output constraint holds with strict inequality in the absence of 
water recycling and compares the amount of outside water withdrawn when the plant 
recycles none of its waste water with the amount of outside water withdrawn when the plant 
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recycles some of its waste water.  Outside water use is reduced regardless of the policy 
choice Θ .  The tax on outside water reduces the total water use and at the same time induces 
water recycling.  The subsidy for water recycling leaves the total water use unchanged while 
induces water recycling. 
Scenario 2 assumes the output constraint holds with equality in the absence of water 
recycling and compares the amount of outside water withdrawn when the plant recycles none 
of its waste water with the amount of outside water withdrawn when the plant recycles some 
of its waste water.  Outside water use is reduced regardless of the policy choice Θ  and 
whether the output constraint continues to hold with equality in the presence of water 
recycling.  A large tax on outside water reduces the total water use and at the same time 
induces water recycling.  A small tax on outside water and the subsidy for water recycling 
both leave the total water use unchanged while induces water recycling.  
Scenario 3 assumes the output constraint holds with equality in the absence of water 
recycling and compares the amount of outside water withdrawn when the plant recycles none 
of its waste water with the amount of outside water withdrawn when the plant recycles all of 
its waste water.  Outside water use is reduced regardless of the policy choice Θ  and whether 
the output constraint continues to hold with equality in the presence of water recycling.  The 
tax on outside water reduces the total water use and at the same time induces water recycling.  
The subsidy for water recycling leaves the total water use unchanged because of the output 
constraint while induces water recycling. 
Scenario 4 assumes the output constraint holds with strict inequality in the absence of 
water recycling and compares the amount of outside water withdrawn when the plant 
recycles none of its waste water with the amount of outside water withdrawn when the plant 
recycles all of its waste water.  Water recycling does lead to a reduction in the amount of 
outside water withdrawn when the government taxes outside water use.  However, it is not 
always the case that outside water use is reduced when the government subsidizes water 
recycling.  Given the assumed ethanol production function, the subsidy for water recycling 
must be sufficiently small to reduce outside water use.  A subsidy for water recycling that is 
too large may adversely induce production expansion and lead to more outside water being 
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used by the plant.  When this occurs, water recycling may no longer be beneficial in reducing 
the growing pressure from the ethanol plants on the water resources.  
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CHAPTER 5.  GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
This dissertation looks at backstop technology as a key to weak sustainability of 
commodity resources.  As resources become scarcer, their price increases and signals a 
switch to a relatively more expensive renewable backstop technology.  The first essay 
illustrates the role of backstop technology in sustainability of commodity resources through 
the use of renewable ground water example.  In the renewable ground water example, both 
artificially recharged ground water and water from other cities act as backstop technologies 
for natural ground water.  In the growing water demand model, the city may have to 
eventually resort to costly water from other cities to satisfy the excess demand.  The artificial 
ground water recharge adds to the natural ground water.  So it can help prolong the period of 
not having to purchase costly water from other cities.  However, due to the costs associated 
with pumping water underground, the artificial ground water recharge is done only when the 
demand is sufficiently high.  In the stochastic rainfall model, it may be relatively cheaper to 
temporarily rely on water from other cities while letting the ground water recharge when the 
current ground water stock is significantly low.  Water may be pumped to the aquifer to 
expedite the ground water recharge.  When the current ground water stock is sufficiently 
large, ground water alone can satisfy the city’s water needs regardless of current rainfall.   
The second essay looks at a linkage between the prices of two substitutable resources, 
ethanol and oil, and tests the hypothesis that the derived demand for fuel ethanol in the US is 
perfectly elastic.  The Johansen and Jesulius multivariate cointegration methodology finds no 
cointegration between the ethanol price and the gasoline price over the period from January 
1995 to October 2008.  The GH residual-based tests for cointegration in models with regime 
shifts indicate that the long-run relationship between the ethanol price and the gasoline price 
exists with a possible structural break at the estimated break point May 2007.  The MTBE 
phase-out, the repeal of the oxygenate requirement for reformulated gasoline, and the 
significantly higher gasoline price in the post-May 2007 period may have caused this break 
in the cointegrating relationship.  Based on the obtained cointegrating relationship, the 
demand for fuel ethanol in the pre-May 2007 period is largely governed by government 
regulations such as the 1990 CAAA oxygenate requirements for oxygenated and 
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reformulated gasoline, while the demand for fuel ethanol in the post-May 2007 period is 
perfectly elastic.  Given that the market operates in the perfectly elastic portion of the derived 
demand for fuel ethanol, the market price of ethanol is derived from the gasoline price.  The 
linkage between the ethanol price and the gasoline price should prove useful for decision 
makers involved in the industry and policy makers in formulating biofuel and energy policy.  
The third essay looks at water recycling in ethanol production as a means to reduce 
some of the ethanol pressure on the water resources.  As can seen, the plant does not recycle 
its waste water when outside water is relatively cheap.  So recycled water may be viewed as 
a backstop technology for outside water in this case.  Since the plant tends to overuse outside 
water, the government may impose a Pigouvian tax on outside water use.  In case a tax 
cannot be imposed on outside water use, the government may subsidize water recycling.  
Depending on whether the output constraint holds with strict inequality in the absence of 
water recycling and whether the plant ends up recycle all of its waste water, a comparison is 
made between the amount of outside water withdrawn by the plant when there is no water 
recycling and the amount of outside water withdrawn by the plant when there is water 
recycling.  It is found that water recycling always leads to a reduction in the amount of 
outside water withdrawn by the plant when the government taxes outside water use.  This is 
because the tax raises the net marginal cost of using outside water.  However, it is not always 
the case that outside water use is reduced when the government subsidizes water recycling.  
Given the assumed ethanol production function, the subsidy for water recycling must be 
sufficiently small to reduce outside water use.  A subsidy for water recycling that is too large 
may adversely induce production expansion and lead to more outside water being used by the 
plant.  When this occurs, water recycling may no longer be beneficial in reducing the 
growing pressure from the ethanol plants on the water resources.  
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